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Abstract
From 1985 to 2002, most Federal conservation dollars going to farm opera-
tors have been to retire land from crop production. Yet most U.S. farmland
(850 million acres) remains in active production. The Farm Security and
Rural Investment (FSRI) Act of 2002 sharply increased conservation
funding and earmarked most of the increase for working-land payment
programs (WLPPs). The design and implementation of WLPPs will largely
determine the extent to which environmental goals are achieved and whether
they are cost effective. We simulate potential environmental gains as well as
adjustments in agricultural production, price, and income associated with
various WLPP features to illustrate tradeoffs arising from WLPP design and
implementation. Competitive bidding with the use of environmental indices
to rank producers for enrollment is most cost effective. Payments based on
past conservation will help support farm incomes, but limit the amount of
additional environmental benefit that can be generated under a fixed budget. 
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Agricultural production can have damaging environmental impacts.
Although past conservation efforts—particularly land retirement—have
helped, agri-environmental problems remain. Because most agricultural land
(850 million acres) remains in production, and many agri-environmental
problems are the result of small contributions from many widely dispersed
farms, improving environmental performance on “working lands” is an
important next step.
What Is the Issue?
The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, or the 2002 farm bill,
shifted U.S. agri-environmental policy from land retirement to conservation
on working lands—land used primarily for crop production and grazing.
Spending for conservation programs was increased by 80 percent over the
previous farm bill, with much of that going to the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Security Program (CSP).
While actual funding of these working-land payment programs (WLPPs) is
unlikely to reach authorized levels, the scope of working-land conservation
is nevertheless expanding. 
Whether this trend continues in subsequent legislation is uncertain. However,
effective design of agri-environmental programs can help stretch the available
budget, whatever it might be, in terms of environmental gains or other pro-
gram goals. But because of the complexity of farm household decisionmaking
and the nonpoint source and site-specific nature of agri-environmental prob-
lems, forecasting the benefits of agri-environmental conservation programs is
data-demanding and technically challenging. 
What Did the Study Find?
Once a working land payment program has been designed—before any pro-
ducers are enrolled or any contracts are signed—most of what can be done
to ensure that program objectives are achieved is locked in place. If funding
is limited, program goals are likely to be achieved only if program decision-
makers can anticipate the effect of enrolling a given producer. 
Producers will apply for participation when the benefits they receive outweigh
their costs, which will depend on program details. Program decisionmakers
may apply enrollment screening criteria to determine which applicants are
enrolled. Participation patterns then determine the environmental and economic
outcomes of the program. The trick is to (1) develop a request for proposals
that is attractive to producers who can contribute to achieving program goals
and (2) develop enrollment screening criteria that use information provided by
the applicants to select those best suited for the job. Policymakers and program
managers may sometimes need to balance conflicting goals of fiscal conser-
vatism versus conservation coverage, acknowledgment of ongoing stewardship
versus reward for all-new efforts, or even resource concerns themselves (man-
aging nutrient runoff, say, versus maintaining soil productivity).
iii
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environmental gain from a limited budget will:
• Structure the application/enrollment process as a “request for proposals,”
which can then be accepted or rejected. This allows program decision-
makers to glean valuable information before committing to a pool of
program applicants. 
• Rank proposals by benefit-cost criteria. Given a pool of willing partici-
pants, information on the practices to be adopted—soil quality in fields
to be enrolled, farms’ proximity to surface water, etc.—can be used to
assess potential environmental benefits. Contract costs can be gleaned
directly from the proposal. Environmental indices, like the
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) in the Conservation Reserve
Program, can then be used to rank proposals. 
• Promote bidding on financial assistance. In a competitive enrollment pro-
gram, bidding on the level of financial assistance (e.g., the cost-share
rate) can stretch budgets by reducing the cost of individual contracts. For
a fixed budget, environmental performance on working lands may be
increased by 25 percent with bidding provisions versus payments based
on an (index-based) estimate of potential environmental benefits.
Stewardship payments. Only policymakers can decide the appropriate
level of a good-stewardship reward. However, rewarding past performance
could mean that there will be less program budget to encourage new conser-
vation efforts. This tradeoff becomes more apparent when new and old prac-
tices are eligible for similar payments and when budgets are relatively
small. In such a program, eligible stewards will have a greater incentive to
accept a given payment for a particular practice they have already imple-
mented than would eligible producers who would be newly adopting the
same practice. Given that the number of eligible stewards is the same
regardless of the budget level, the proportion of the budget allocated to
stewardship payments will increase as the size of the budget decreases.
Alternatively, program managers could decide to set aside a fixed proportion
of the budget to reward stewards and another portion to encourage new
adoption. 
• Simulation results indicate that when budgets are capped at $500 million,
a program that provides equal payments for both new and existing prac-
tices may achieve only one-fourth as much environmental gain as a pro-
gram that focuses exclusively on new conservation activities. At lower
budgets, given that the number of eligible stewards is still the same, a
greater share of the budget goes toward stewardship payments and a
smaller share is available to encourage new conservation efforts. A $250-
million program that provides equal payments for new and existing prac-
tices may achieve less than one-twelfth as much environmental gain as a
program that pays only for new practices. 
• Payments designed to reward producers who are already good environmen-
tal stewards will limit the cost-effectiveness of achieving new environ-
mental benefits, but may complement other programs that target regions
or producers with a high potential for environmental improvement. 
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WLPPs depend on which agri-environmental problems are emphasized in
the establishment of program incentives or enrollment criteria. These
emphases are implicit in the environmental indices used to rank and select
program participants. In the past, conservation practices that maintain and
enhance soil productivity have been heavily weighted. We find that the envi-
ronmental impacts of deviating from this paradigm are minimal because
many conservation practices address multiple resource concerns.
How Was the Study Conducted?
A conceptual framework describes the effect of program design decisions on
producer application, program enrollment, and, ultimately environmental
gain and economic outcomes (e.g., farm income effects). We describe a
range of design options available to policymakers and discuss each in terms
of environmental gain and equity considerations. We estimate the
magnitude—regarding public spending, environmental gain, and change in
farm income—for several specific designs using the U.S. Agriculture
Mathematical Programming (USMP) model.
USMP and environmental simulation models linked to it are used to quanti-
fy the potential environmental and economic tradeoffs in selecting among
program objectives and design features. The report uses cost-effectiveness to
measure program success and compare alternative program designs; i.e.,
how much environmental gain was achieved by each alternative design for a
given level of public expenditure? 
v
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Setting the Stage
Farmers make choices daily about which land to use for crops or grazing
and how to manage that land. Decisions with potentially important environ-
mental implications include what to produce, how much fertilizer and pesti-
cide to use, which tillage practice to employ, and whether to install
conservation measures like grassed waterways. Conservation programs aim
to improve the environmental performance of agriculture by influencing
those decisions. 
What Has Worked . . . To a Point
Policymakers can choose from a wide range of agri-environmental policy
instruments, but rely heavily on voluntary participation payment programs
(see box, “Major USDA Conservation Programs”). For most of the two
decades preceding 2002, most USDA financial assistance for conservation
was for land retirement under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and
the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP). These two programs accounted for
nearly four-fifths of such financial assistance in the 1990s, with spending of
$1.5 billion or more annually. 
But land retirement programs, despite environmental gains, are costly and
do not address problems on the vast area of land that remains in agricultural
production. During these same years (before 2002), Federal financial assis-
tance for working-land programs was modest. Such programs include the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Wildlife Habitat Incen-
tives Program (WHIP), and CRP’s continuous signup that encourages instal-
lation of buffer practices such as filter strips and grassed waterways.
Nonfinancial assistance programs include Conservation Technical Assis-
tance (CTA), which provides in-kind technical support to producers who
want to install or adopt conservation practices without Federal cost-sharing
or incentives. Conservation compliance, meanwhile, requires farmers to
adopt soil-conserving practices on highly erodible cropland or risk loss of
Federal farm program benefits. While these efforts have helped promote
conservation on working lands, our focus is on voluntary, financial assis-
tance programs—working-land payment programs (WLPPs). 
Although land retirement will continue to be an important part of U.S. agri-
environmental policy, it appears that programs directed at working land
conservation are growing. Many resource concerns—such as nutrient and
pesticide runoff—may be more cost-effectively addressed on the 850
million acres of active cropland and grazing land than on idled land. Much
of the 80-percent boost in conservation funding outlined by the Farm Secu-
rity and Rural Investment Act of 2002 is slated for conservation efforts on
working lands (fig. 1.1). 
In many instances, WLPPs could achieve environmental benefits at a lower
cost per acre under land retirement programs because land remains in
production and farmers are able to sell commodities. Also, pressing agri-
1
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Agricultural Land Preservation and Other Programs
Land Retirement Programs
• The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Conservation Reserve
Enhancement Program (CREP) offer annual payments and cost-sharing to
establish long-term, resource-conserving cover, usually grass or trees, on
environmentally sensitive land. 
• The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) provides cost-sharing and/or long-
term or permanent easements for restoration of wetlands on agricultural land. 
Working-Land Payment Programs
• The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) provides technical
assistance and cost-sharing or incentive payments to assist livestock and crop
producers with conservation and environmental improvements on working
lands. 
• The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Continuous Signup provides
cost-sharing and annual payments to producers who establish “buffer” prac-
tices such as riparian buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, and contour
grass strips to intercept sediment and nutrients before they leave the field.
• The Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) provides cost-sharing to
landowners and producers to develop and improve wildlife habitat. 
• The Conservation Security Program (CSP) will reward demonstrated land
stewards for implementing appropriate land-based practices on working
lands that address one or more resources of concern, such as soil, water, or
wildlife habitat.
Agricultural Land Preservation Programs
• The Farm and Ranch Lands Protection Program (FRPP) provides funds to
State, tribal, or local governments and private organizations to help purchase
development rights and keep productive farmland in agricultural use. 
• The Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) is designed to preserve and improve
native-grass grazing lands through long-term contracts and easements. While
normal haying and grazing activities will be allowed under GRP, producers
and landowners cannot crop the land and will be required to restore and
maintain native grass and shrub species. 
Technical Assistance
• The Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA) Program has been providing
conservation technical assistance for planning and implementation of conser-
vation systems since 1935.
Compliance Mechanisms
• Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster, and Swampbuster are provisions that
tie the receipt of farm payments to management of highly erodible land and
wetlands.environmental problems like soil, pesticide, and nutrient runoff from farmed
land, can be more fully addressed. Maximizing the benefits of WLPPs pres-
ents considerable challenges. Which producers apply for enrollment in the
program, what land they offer, and what practices they employ will depend
largely on the level of payment producers are offered. Which of these
producer offers is ultimately accepted will depend on the rules or proce-
dures the government uses to decide which applications to accept. These
decisions, together, will determine the economic and environmental effects
of the WLPP. 
Program performance—both economic and environmental—depends criti-
cally on program design. Design decisions that will influence participation
include eligibility criteria, payment rates for conservation practices, and
methods used to rank program applicants (see Claassen et al., 2001).
The design challenge is compounded by the diversity of farm types, crops,
farming practices, and environmental concerns. This is especially compli-
cated for WLPPs because these programs would fund a broader range of
practices on a wider range of land types than land retirement programs have
generally done. For many funded practices, environmental effectiveness and
adoption cost will vary significantly across farms and—for practices like
nutrient management—implementation will be difficult to monitor and
enforcement costly. Finally, the coexistence of major land retirement and
working land programs will heighten the need for coordination to avoid
inconsistencies and duplication of effort.
In general, it is difficult to accurately predict which producers will partici-
pate and what land and practices they will offer in response to a given set of
participation incentives. Before a program is implemented, program deci-
sionmakers may have only a general sense of potential benefits or costs of
inducing sufficient producer participation. Programs that collect site-specific
data on contract offers may help in determining which applications to accept
for program enrollment. 
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Ag Land Preservation (FRPP and GRP)
Working Land Conservation (EQIP and 
predecessors, CSP, and WHIP)
Land Retirement (CRP and WRP)
Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA)*
*Expenditures on CTA estimated for 2005-2011 using 22-year trend.
Sources: Compiled by Economic Rsearch Service, UDSA using data from
Office of Budget and Policy Analysis, USDA, and the Congressional Budget Office.
Figure 1.1
Conservation emphasis appears to be shifting 
from land retirement to working land
Billion dollarsWe address a broad range of issues concerning the design and implementa-
tion of WLPPs and the potential economic and environmental implications
of alternative policy designs. Discussions are illustrated using examples
from existing working land programs, including the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) and the newer Conservation Security Program
(CSP). Illustrations are also drawn from the CRP. 
Specifically, this report seeks to address the following questions:
1) How can program design be used to help shape the pool of appli-
cants who are willing to participate in working land payment 
programs?
2) How can program design be used to enroll producers who could
make a particularly valuable contribution to program objectives?
3)  What impact do the design criteria have on performance in terms of
cost-effectiveness, environmental efficiency, and equity objectives?
4
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Designing Voluntary Incentive
Payments for Working Land
Conservation
Water quality, air quality, abundant wildlife, and open space are among the
issues addressed by agri-environmental policy. Agri-environmental programs
may also have secondary goals like helping farmers comply with environ-
mental regulation, supporting farm incomes, and ensuring an equitable distri-
bution of payments across regions. To design a cost-effective WLPP (see box,
“What Is Environmental Cost-Effectiveness?”), it is necessary to (1) identify
those producers, land, and practices that are most likely to secure program
objectives at least cost; and (2) devise eligibility criteria, incentives, and enroll-
ment screening criteria that will attract those producers, land, and practices. 
Benefits from WLPPs 
Contingent on Design
Agri-environmental incentives, when offered to farmers, trigger a sequence
of events that includes producer bids, program enrollment, the application of
conservation practices, the disbursement of payments, and ultimately envi-
ronmental and economic outcomes. Once enrollment decisions are
made—well before any of the contracted practices have been adopted or
installed—most of what can be done to ensure that program objectives are
achieved will already have been done. Thus, designing a cost-effective
5
Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land: What Challenges Lie Ahead?/ERR-5
Economic Research Service/USDA
What Is Environmental Cost-Effectiveness?
Environmental cost-effectiveness is achieved when an environmental goal or
objective is  attained at the lowest possible cost to society as a whole. Note that
“cost” is not necessarily equal to government expenditure. Costs include the
full (private and public) cost of adopting or installing and maintaining benefi-
cial conservation practices, including federally provided technical assistance,
and transaction costs. If government payments and technical support exceed
producer conservation costs, the amount exceeding cost is a transfer payment
to the producer. Because the transfer payment is simultaneously a cost to
taxpayers and a benefit to the producer, these costs and benefits cancel one
another for society as a whole. When program expenditure is limited by a
budget (e.g., EQIP) or acreage allocation (e.g., CRP), an alternate formulation
of the cost-effectiveness criterion can be used: maximize environmental gain
given the available budget. The budget-constrained cost-effectiveness criterion
is not a precise mirror image of the standard cost-effectiveness criterion. To
maximize environmental gain subject to a budget constraint, both the economic
cost of environmental gains (just as in the standard cost-effectiveness criterion)
and transfer payments must be minimized. In contrast to the standard cost-
effectiveness criterion where transfer payments are a wash, transfer payments
are an issue in the budget-constrained case because they use up budget
resources that could be devoted to further reducing environmental damage. As
a result, budget-constrained cost-effectiveness is more difficult to achieve than
standard cost-effectiveness. program—regardless of objectives—places a premium on the ability of
program decisionmakers to anticipate program outcomes. 
To anticipate outcomes, it is necessary to anticipate how producers will react
to the offer of payments and how their changed practices would affect the
environment. The way government structures an agri-environmental pro-
gram—effectively its “offer” to producers—will largely determine what
information can be gleaned from the application process and how it can be
used to determine program enrollment (Phase I, fig. 2.1). Broadly speaking,
all existing U.S. agri-environmental payment programs use one of two basic
structures:
• Request for proposal. In most agri-environmental programs, the govern-
ment’s offer is, in fact, a request for proposals from producers. The gov-
ernment’s offer generally indicates who can submit proposals (i.e., who
is eligible), minimum requirements in terms of conservation action, how
much producers can expect to be paid (or, for some programs, the maxi-
mum bid that could be acceptable), and the criteria by which proposals
will be assessed. Participants are then selected on the basis of the specif-
ic environmental benefits they offer and costs they incur, or another set
of criteria that reflect policymaker objectives. A producer’s offer typical-
ly specifies the land to be enrolled, what resource concerns will be
addressed, what practices will be adopted or installed, and, in some pro-
grams, the level of payment the producer is willing to accept for taking
the specified actions. 
• Payment offer. In some programs (e.g., continuous signup for CRP), the
government offers producers a given payment (usually based on conser-
vation cost or land rents) for taking a given action and allows them to
choose to participate without further assessment by the government. If
necessary, budget or other limits can be enforced by withdrawing the
offer when the limit is reached (i.e., first-come, first served). In the spe-
cial case of an entitlement program—where eligible, willing producers
cannot be denied enrollment, regardless of budgetary consequences—
spending would be determined by the extent of participation (e.g., how
much land, which practices).
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Figure 2.1
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•The difference between these two approaches is in the extent of final review
by the government. This process, which we call enrollment screening,
allows program decisionmakers to gather farm- or field-specific data (e.g.,
location, soil types, topography, proposed practice changes) that can be very
helpful in assessing potential environmental benefits. This information can
be used to better weigh the potential environmental benefits against contract
costs for specific proposals. 
Meanwhile, a producer’s attitude toward a given program can be summa-
rized in a single question: “Am I willing to take the specified actions in
exchange for the payment offered?” What producers are willing to accept
(WTA) will depend on factors like their cost of adopting conservation prac-
tices, attitudes about and awareness of conservation problems, wealth, and
level of aversion to the risk of trying new practices (see box, “Producers’
Willingness To Accept Payments”). By definition, producers are willing to
participate so long as the incentive offered meets or exceeds their WTA. For
example, if a producer is willing to adopt conservation tillage for a payment
of $5 per acre, he will be willing to participate in any program where he is
offered $5 or more per acre for conservation tillage adoption. While
producers’WTAs are generally unknown, a program implementation
process that includes competitive bids for financial assistance may induce
producers to reveal their WTAs—which can lower program costs if program
decisionmakers use this information in determining which producer applica-
tions to accept. 
Decisions about eligibility, participation incentives, and enrollment screening
must be made simultaneously, particularly when the program budget is
limited. For example, broad eligibility and large participation incentives will
yield a large pool of program applicants, which can then be narrowed using an
enrollment screen. A broad pool of applicants may be environmentally cost-
effective because it is more likely to include those producers who can make
the most profound contributions to achieving program goals. The risk in this
approach is that many applications will be reviewed only to be rejected,
possibly straining administrative resources and/or discouraging producers
from again applying for agri-environmental programs. 
In an entitlement program, enrollment screening is moot—those producers
who meet eligibility requirements and are willing to accept the payment
offered must be enrolled. As a consequence, achieving cost-effectiveness
requires that eligibility requirements and incentives be designed to attract
producers best suited to making a cost-effective contribution to program
objectives. This goal can be accomplished, but only at a cost (in terms of
program expenditure) that is higher than may be necessary if an enrollment
screen was used.
The need to make program provisions work together is not limited to deci-
sions about a single program. WLPPs are likely to interact with other agri-
cultural and environmental programs. Accounting for that interaction in
program design can help avoid conflict or duplication between programs
(see chapter 4 for more details). 
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Producers may consider a variety of issues in deciding
whether to apply for any voluntary agri-environmental
program. These factors can be summarized in a single
question, "Am I willing to take the specified actions in
exchange for the payment offered?" Because many agri-
environmental programs allow producers to propose
which portion(s) of the farm would be enrolled and which
practice(s) would be adopted or installed, the question
may also be formulated as, "What am I willing to offer,
given the level of payment that is potentially available?" 
In either case, the level of payment the producer is willing
to accept (WTA) for undertaking any conservation prac-
tice or activity reflects a variety of costs and benefits to
the producer. Most obvious (and most easily measured)
are the out-of-pocket costs to adopt or install conservation
practices. These include earthworks to build terraces or
waterways and machinery upgrades needed to practice
reduced- or no-till farming. Other obvious (but less easily
measured) costs are from adoption or installation of
management practices. For example, producers adopting
nutrient management may save on fertilizer but could also
risk reductions in yield. 
For some producers, the transaction costs associated with
program signup can be considerable. These costs can
include time and travel required to meet with USDA staff
and develop conservation plans in conjunction with tech-
nical experts (provided by USDA). Likewise, risk aversion
may increase WTA as risk-averse producers require greater
payment for making changes perceived as risky. Finally,
WTA may also reflect other factors like wealth, education
and attitudes about environmental quality, and participation
in government programs.
Because the factors that underlie WTA can vary widely
among producers, WTA can also vary widely among
different producers who install or adopt the same practice
or address the same resource concern. Understanding the
likely distribution of WTA among producers is important
because it can help policymakers assess the proportion of
producers to adopt certain practices or address certain
resource concerns for a given level of payment. This vari-
ation in WTA can be depicted by a bell-shaped or normal
curve. To depict the bell-shaped curve in a way that is
directly relevant to agri-environmental program participa-
tion, we graph the proportion of acres controlled by
producers with WTA of a specific level or less. This type
of curve is known as a probability density function or
PDF. The more (less) variation in WTA for adoption of
any given practice, the smaller (larger) the “peak” in the
bell curve and the less (more) pronounced the “S” shape
of the cumulative distribution function (CDF).
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A bell-shaped PDF, or “normal” curve, is used to 
represent the distribution of WTA. Average WTA is 
represented by point B. Relatively few acres are 
owned/farmed by producers who have WTA significantly 
less than the average level (point A) or significantly 
higher than average (point C).  Some acreage has a 
zero WTA because the practice has already been 
adopted.
This s-shaped CDF formulation shows the proportion of 
acres with WTA at or less than a given level. On only a 
handful of acres (where the practice is not already 
adopted), WTA is less than or equal to A.  In contrast, 
WTA is less than or equal to C on almost all acres.  A 
payment of $A would result in enrollment of only a 
handful of producers, while a payment of $C would send 
enrollment to nearly 100 percent.
Producers’Willingness To Accept Payments (WTA)After the enrollment phase, contracts are signed, technical assistance is
provided, conservation practices are adopted, and incentive payments are
disbursed (Phase II, fig. 2.1). However, compliance is not assured. Given the
wide range of practices typically available in a WLPP, checking that prac-
tices are actually adopted as specified in the contracts is difficult—more so
for management practices than for structural practices (Johansson, 2002).
For example, the existence of terraces or grassed waterways—as well as the
appropriateness of their design and the extent to which they have been
maintained—can be observed directly. But it is very difficult to confirm that
nutrient management plans are being fully implemented in the field.
Finally, although monitoring of agri-environmental outcomes (Phase III, fig.
2.1) has been used only sparingly in agri-environmental programs, informa-
tion gained from monitoring could be used to adjust program design to
better meet policy objectives. This type of ex-post evaluation could help
improve cost-effectiveness by honing environmental indices and other
“tools” used in program implementation.
Attracting the Right Participants:
Program Design Alternatives
Policymakers have a number of tools that can be used to influence WLPP
participation. In particular, eligibility criteria, payment incentives, and
enrollment screens can be used to direct resources toward producers, land,
and practices that are most likely to achieve program objectives. Cost-effec-
tiveness depends largely on how these tools are used and how they are
combined into an overall program design.
Before these tools can be applied, however, it is important to be clear about
what the program is expected to achieve, environmentally and otherwise
(see box, “Defining Program Objectives”). Broad directives, aimed at
general resource concerns, such as “improve water quality” or “increase
wildlife habitat” are not specific enough for effective program design. To
establish a practical agri-environmental program, environmental indicators
that measure the need for action and progress toward addressing resource
concerns are also important. The selection of indicators is effectively the
selection of a more specific set of program objectives. When programs seek
to address multiple objectives, moreover, some method of weighing objec-
tives (indicators) against each other is needed when, inevitably, conflicts
arise. Once these decisions are made, program decisionmakers can proceed
effectively with all other aspects of program design: eligibility criteria,
payment incentives, and enrollment screens.
Eligibility is often used as a broad “first cut” in defining participation
because it determines who can apply for enrollment and what practices they
can use. EQIP, for example, sponsors a wide range of practices on many
different land types—virtually any type of farm, any type of agricultural
land, and any practice found in the NRCS National Conservation Practice
Handbook can be funded. Because eligibility has been so broad, program
decisionmakers have used other means (e.g., enrollment screening) to select
participants on the basis of environmental benefits and costs. 
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narrow group of “buffer practices”—shown to significantly reduce sediment
and nutrient losses to surface water (Dosskey, 2001)—is eligible for enroll-
ment. The pool of potential applicants is narrowed in CSP by requiring
producers to demonstrate past stewardship before they are eligible for
program enrollment. Only those producers who have already addressed soil
quality and water quality concerns on at least a part of their farm are
eligible, and only those portions of the farm where these resource concerns
have been addressed can be enrolled.
10
Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land: What Challenges Lie Ahead?/ERR-5
Economic Research Service/USDA
Defining Program Objectives
Practical agri-environmental objectives can be formulated in a number of ways.
One way is to meet a specific, definable standard for a specific resource. For
example, a water quality objective may be defined as meeting a specific maximum
concentration of nutrients or other pollutants in a lake or along a stream. Many
nonagricultural environmental programs use this method for defining goals. Under
the Clean Water Act, for example, the Total Maximum Daily Load provisions
require States to identify impaired water bodies where controls on municipal and
industrial discharges will not achieve water quality standards. The State must
define the maximum load of the problem pollutant that the water body can absorb
and still achieve water quality standards. Load allocations are then assigned to
both point- and nonpoint-source dischargers in the watershed so that the
maximum load is not exceeded. 
However, most agri-environmental payment programs have multiple environ-
mental objectives. To weigh the environmental objectives against one another,
multi-objective programs often use environmental indices. Both CRP and EQIP
use indices to rank producer-proposed contracts by their potential to generate
environmental benefits. In budget- or acreage-limited programs, environmental
indices, used together with information on contract cost, can help program deci-
sionmakers determine which contracts to accept. 
When an environmental index is used, the proportion of total points allocated to
various resource concerns defines objectives, implicitly. In the CRP, for
example, addressing water quality concerns on a parcel of land is allotted a
maximum of 100 points, while a maximum of 35 points can be assigned for
addressing air quality concerns. The difference reflects program decisionmaker
perceptions as to environmental value or urgency. Decisionmakers may use
location, soils, practices to be adopted, and other information to determine how
many points to assign for each resource concern. Variation reflects diversity of
environmental problems faced by producers and variation in their ability to
address them. 
Nonenvironmental objectives, such as income support, may be an explicit or
implicit consideration in the formulation of agri-environmental programs.
Equity is often an issue. While any definition of equity is subjective, objective
economic analysis can help policymakers understand the effect of program
design decisions on different groups within the farm sector and society at large.
For example, policymakers may be concerned with the distribution of payments
among farms and their effect on farm income. In the 2002 farm bill, regional
equity emerged as an issue in the distribution of agri-environmental payments.
Special preferences may also be given to limited-resource farmers or beginning
farmers. Equity concerns have been raised on behalf of “good actors”—
producers who have already reached a high level of environmental performance. 11
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Table 2.1—Agri-environmental program design options
Program feature Options Potential effects
Budget
Continuously variable; allocations may reflect
concern about regional equity
As budget increases, so does program scope; may sig-
nificantly affect decisions on screening, eligibility, and
incentives.
Eligibility
Can be based on wide range of factors: farm
type, land type, practices, past stewardship,
geographic area, etc.
Can be used to focus program implementation on pro-
ducers, land, and practices most likely to cost-effectively
produce environmental benefits.
Enrollment screens
Performance-based Selection of participants based on ability to meet program
objectives. If based on environmental benefits and cost,
can promote environmental cost-effectiveness.
Allocative Budget can be allocated in ways considered to be fair,
e.g., equal allocation among producers; first-come, first-






Producers are paid according to the (estimated) value
of their conservation actions. Can encourage environ-
mental cost-effectiveness by directing greatest participa-
tion incentive to high-benefit, low-WTA (willingness to
accept) producers. However, these incentives can also
be costly in terms of budget.
Fixed, cost-based
Payments are proportional to actual cost (as in cost-
sharing for structural practices) or an estimate of cost
(as in incentive payments for management practices).
Environmental cost-effectiveness can be improved by
using performance-based screen.
Bid-based
Payments are based on bids that, ideally, reveal the
minimum payment producers are willing to accept for
taking conservation actions. Maximum acceptable rates
are often specified. When used in conjunction with a
performance-based enrollment screen, an environmen-
tally cost-effective outcome is possible.
Stewardship Likely to ensure continued maintenance of existing prac-
tices, but direct environmental gain will be small.
Indirectly, may reduce producer hesitance to adopt con-
servation practices without program support because
they will not be frozen out of opportunity for future 
payments
Payment limits can be applied annually, to
overall contracts, etc.
May restrict participation of large farms; ensure that 
participation is more widespread. Effect on cost-
effectiveness is unclear.
Implementation
Information costs Good planning and technical assistance can improve
cost-effectiveness, but it can be expensive. Information
can also improve cost-effectiveness by leading to more
accurate and detailed payment schedules or enrollment
screens. But how much information and analysis can be
justified on a benefit-cost basis?
Enforcement Greater monitoring effort increases likelihood that viola-
tion will be detected; greater penalties increase the
potential loss if violation is detected; both increase
incentives to comply.
Program coordination Not a specific program provision, but may
affect specification of other provisions
Can improve environmental cost-effectiveness by reduc-
ing conflict and/or duplication with other programs.Incentives and Enrollment Screens
Can Work Together
In most programs, where eligibility criteria are broad, most of the work in
selecting participants is done through a combination of payment incentives
and enrollment screening. In general, higher payment rates will lead to
broader program application, but exactly how many producers will apply
and what actions they will offer to take depends largely on how the incen-
tives are designed. It can be very difficult (or very expensive) to design
payment incentives so that the pool of applicants contains only those
producers, land, and practices that can (1) most cost-effectively meet
program objectives and (2) be funded within the program budget. Conse-
quently, many programs use enrollment screens to help select participants
and make sure that budget limits are not breached (see box, “Enrollment
Screening and Budgets”).1
Existing enrollment screens are generally performance-based. The term
“performance” refers to estimated physical effects of adopting conservation
practices (e.g., reduced erosion and sediment delivery to water) and the
potential benefits that society derives from them (e.g., lower water treatment
costs, enhanced water-based recreation). One of the best-known examples of
a performance-based screen is the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) used
to select CRP participants. Producers offer specific tracts of land (with
specific environmental characteristics), identify what type of cover they will
establish (e.g., grass or trees), and what level of cost-sharing and annual
payment they are willing to accept. Program managers can also obtain tract-
specific information from existing databases (e.g., soil survey information),
and so score proposed contracts by benefit-cost criteria using the EBI.
Contracts with EBI scores above a cutoff level are accepted.2
But enrollment screening need not be performance-based. Any method of
allocating a limited budget can be used as an enrollment screen. For
example, producers may be enrolled on a first-come, first-served basis until
the program budget (or other limit) is exhausted. CRP’s continuous signup
for high-priority practices follows this method. On eligible land, buffer prac-
tices such as filter strips or grassed waterways are eligible without the
competitive review process that accompanies regular signup. Because eligi-
bility is limited to a few practices with profound environmental benefits, a
competitive process is waived.
Of course, the extent to which screening is needed depends considerably on
the level and type of payments available to producers. Payments for the
adoption/installation of new practices can generally be grouped into three
categories: fixed-rate payments, performance-based payments, and bid-
based payments. Payments can also be based on stewardship, i.e., ongoing
conservation effort.
New Practices: Fixed-Rate Payments. Fixed rate refers to a fixed incentive
payment (dollars per acre or per practice) or, in the case of cost sharing, a
fixed cost-share rate, e.g., 75 percent. Cost sharing reimburses farmers for
part of the cost of installing structural (or vegetative) practices such as
terraces and grassed waterways. The actual cost of installation can be deter-
1Appendix 1 contains a graphical
analysis exploring these tradeoffs in
more depth.
2Producers are unlikely to be aware
of the level of environmental benefit
they can produce, given that many
benefits will accrue offsite (e.g., down-
stream). 
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A. Maximize environmental score per dollar of program


















Evaluation of applications hinges on the criteria adopted to
rank eligible applicants. Here, several possibilities are
presented using 13 hypothetical applicants plotted
according to their environmental score and per-acre cost to
the government. Black points represent applications that
would not be accepted; white points represent applications
that would. 
This first approach (A), which coincides with how EQIP
functioned until 2002, enrolls applications based on their
benefit/cost ratio. The evaluation process can be portrayed
by rotating clockwise a "cutoff" line: applications above
the line are accepted, those below are rejected. How far the
line is rotated depends on the available budget. The advan-
tage of this approach is that the largest number of acres will
be accepted into the program (short of evaluating applica-
tions based exclusively on cost). The disadvantage is that
some acres may be accepted simply because the conserva-
tion measures to be adopted are very cheap, and as a result,
provide only minimal environmental benefits.
Another approach (B) is to accept applications with the
highest environmental scores until the funds are exhausted.
This approach excludes all cost considerations from the
evaluation procedure. The drawback is that it could reject
an application with an environmental score that is just
below cutoff but would be less costly to fund than some
that are accepted. When cost is excluded, some applica-
tions that are rejected may be more environmentally cost-
effective than the applications that are accepted. Many
States adopted this method in 2002 when the U.S.
Congress passed EQIP legislation that discourages cost
considerations in the evaluation procedure.
An intermediate approach (C) assigns additional points to
applications for cost-effectiveness. This can be portrayed
as a sloped cutoff line. The more cost-effectiveness is
emphasized, the steeper the slope of the line. States
following this approach are Colorado, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
Enrollment Screening and Budgetsmined from receipts for earthwork, seed, and other necessary inputs and
services. Incentive payments encourage adoption of management changes
where cost is not easily defined. For example, conservation tillage may save
on labor and fuel but increase herbicide costs. In EQIP, for example, incen-
tive payments are made to encourage the adoption of management practices,
but are not tied to the producer’s cost of adopting these practices.
There is no guarantee that producers who apply for payments will be able to
make environmental contributions that are more cost-effective than those
who choose not to apply. If environmental benefits are typically high when
producer WTA is low (i.e., benefits and WTA are negatively correlated),
fixed-rate payment arrangements can produce a relatively cost-effective
outcome. In other words, producers willing to participate with low payments
are also those with relatively high benefits to offer. This is not very likely
(see box, “Correlating Costs, Benefits, and Rental Rates”). With perform-
ance-based screening, however, program decisionmakers can select
producers who can produce relatively large environmental benefits relative
to costs. Using a screen in conjunction with fixed payments can signifi-
cantly improve cost-effectiveness.
Of course, fixed-rate payments need not be based on the cost (real or esti-
mated) of adopting, installing, or maintaining conservation practices. For
example, policymakers seeking to direct income support through these
programs may want to reimburse producers above conservation costs.
However, funds intended as income support may direct participation away
from producers who can deliver high environmental benefits at a low cost,
because the income support-related payment is not necessarily positively
correlated with environmental benefits or negatively correlated with conser-
vation costs. In a budget-limited program, moreover, these additional
payments would divert funds from leveraging additional environmental gains.
New Practices: Performance-Based Payments. Performance-based payments
compensate farmers based on actual or estimated environmental benefits
from their actions. For example, the Soil Condition Index, developed by
NRCS, helps determine the CSP payment rate for practices designed to
improve soil quality, with measurements both before and after the approved
practice is adopted. 
When payments are based on (estimated) performance, producers will apply
if their WTA is less than or equal to the (estimated) value of their actions.3
Those whose estimated performance is high, but who can adopt practices
designed to achieve that performance at low cost, are most motivated to and
most likely to apply. Consequently, the pool of applicants is likely to
include largely the same producers who would have been selected using a
performance-based enrollment screen, assuming the same performance
measures are used in both cases.
However, providing the payment incentives that make this self-selection
process work can be costly. When a producer’s payment exceeds his WTA,
that producer receives some surplus over the minimum amount he or she
would have been willing to accept, and money is diverted from other
conservation efforts. Without proper safeguards, moreover, these additional
3Producers may not know the envi-
ronmental potential of their actions.
Providing this information can
improve the cost-effectiveness of the
program because it equips producers
to respond effectively to the offer of
incentive payments. In short, perform-
ance-based programs are most effec-
tive when producers are fully aware of
the environmental impact of their
actions. 
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The table below shows the correlation coefficient between environmental bene-
fits, conservation costs, and land rental rates for seven combinations of
resource concern and land type. The correlation coefficient is a measure of
linear association that can have values between -1 and 1. When the correlation
coefficient is -1, variables are perfectly negatively correlated. In other words,
when one variable is high, the other is low. Likewise, a correlation coefficient
of 1 indicates perfect positive correlation, while a coefficient equal to zero indi-
cates no correlation. 
Only one resource concern/land type combination—soil productivity damage
due to wind erosion—shows negative correlation between potential benefits
(damage reduction) and cost and positive correlation between potential benefits
and land rental rates. The correlation between benefits and costs is low. More-
over, the potential soil productivity benefit of reducing wind erosion is modest.
In all other cases, benefits are positively correlated with costs. Benefits are nega-
tively correlated with rental rates in some cases and positively correlated in
others. For water quality, where potential benefits are particularly high, benefits
are positively correlated with costs and negatively correlated with rental rates.
These results indicate that benefit-cost targeting could likely improve the envi-
ronmental cost effectiveness of a program, using cost-based or rental rate-based
payments.
For a more extensive, technical discussion of these issues see Babcock et al.
(1997) and Wu et al. (2001). These authors focus on land retirement but find that
targeting on the basis of cost is equivalent to benefit-cost targeting only when
costs and benefits are negatively and highly correlated.
Average Correlation
benefits coefficient
Benefit Land type Conservation Rental
$/acre cost rate
Water quality Nonirrigated cropland 20.4 0.14 -0.07
Air quality Nonirrigated cropland 3.02 0.07 -0.064
Soil productivity—
water erosion Nonirrigated cropland 3.74 0.08 0.31
Soil productivity—
wind erosion Nonirrigated cropland 3.53 -0.14 0.58
Wildlife habitat Nonirrigated cropland 18.41 0.36 0.37
Wildlife habitat Grazing land 7.86 0.16 0.2
Note: County CRP rates are used for cropland, Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) rates for
grazing land.
Sources: ERS analysis of NRCS and FSA data. See Web Appendix C
(www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err5) for a detailed discussion.
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changes in land use that could undercut program goals (see chapter 4).
Furthermore, any program in which (1) conservation payments exceed
conservation costs and (2) payments are tied to agricultural land could
inflate land values and ultimately intensify land use, depending on the size
of the payments and whether they are viewed as long term. 
New Practices: Bid-Based Payments. Program decisionmakers can
encourage producers to reveal their specific WTA through competitive
bidding on cost-share or incentive payment rates. Generally, a maximum bid
is established (e.g., 75 percent cost-share in pre-2002 EQIP), but producers
are otherwise free to bid as they wish. Bids would encompass a statement of
which parcels of land will be enrolled, what practices will be adopted or
installed on that land, and the level of financial assistance the producer
would accept for taking the specified actions.
As with fixed-rate payments, bid-based payments will not automatically
attract producers able to make environmental contributions that are rela-
tively cost-effective. When paired with a performance-based enrollment
screen, however, bid-based payments can produce a cost-effective outcome.4
If bidding is competitive, incentive payments will approximate producers’
WTAs and government payments will be minimized (see box, “Bidding and
Budgets,” p. 17, and Appendix 1). Thus, the risk of unintended conse-
quences is quite low. Bidding may also facilitate participation of producers
with relatively high WTA but who could, nonetheless, produce benefits large
enough to make a cost-effective contribution. Of course, bid-based
payments provide little, if any, boost to farm income. If bidding is competi-
tive, and producers do bid their WTA, there will be no surplus left over to
supplement farm income. 
Stewardship Payments. Finally, unlike most agri-environmental programs
that extend payments based only on practices that were to be adopted, stew-
ardship payments are based on past conservation efforts. For example, under
CSP, producers may qualify for payments based on practices that were
adopted or installed before enrollment. In other words, so-called “good
actors”—those producers who have already adopted or installed environ-
mentally beneficial practices—can be rewarded with program payments. 
Proponents argue that stewardship payments address a fundamental inequity
in current programs—that good stewards will no longer be excluded from
agri-environmental payment programs just because they have taken the initia-
tive in addressing resource concerns on their farms. They criticize traditional
U.S. agri-environmental payment programs for rewarding those who have
done little to maintain or enhance environmental quality while good stewards
have done so without payment. Some are concerned that producers will be
reluctant to address resource concerns outside the context of a payment
program for fear of being frozen out of current or future programs. There is
also some concern that good stewards could find themselves at a competitive
disadvantage and may subsequently abandon conservation practices or fail to
maintain them in the absence of ongoing payments. 
4Evidence suggests that policymak-
ers have been successful in designing
cost-effective programs using environ-
mental indices and bid-based pay-
ments. In the CRP, policymakers have
done both. The 1990 farm bill man-
dated a change in CRP enrollment pro-
cedures, from what was effectively a
fixed payment without performance-
based enrollment screening to a sys-
tem with bid-based payments and
performance-based screening (the
Environmental Benefits Index). A
1999 study of the CRP (Feather et al.)
found that use the use of EBI and bid-
ding significantly improved the cost-
effectiveness of that program. The
study also noted that additional gains
were possible through further refine-
ment of the EBI.
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mental gains. Opponents of stewardship payments argue that they divert
funds from practice installation or adoption in budget-limited programs.
Moreover, unless stewardship payments are positively correlated with poten-
tial for achieving environmental benefits and negatively correlated with
producer WTA for taking the necessary action, they do little to encourage
participation among producers who could (in addition to a history of good
stewardship) take additional actions to improve environmental quality. As
presently configured in the CSP, stewardship payments are based on land
rental rates, which are unrelated to either environmental benefits or conser-
vation costs (see box, “Correlating Costs, Benefits, and Rental Rates”).
Payment Limitations. Regardless of payment mechanism, program payments
can be limited on an annual basis or over a period of years. In terms of
equity, payment limitations can ensure broader access to an agri-
environmental program. However, farms large enough to be constrained by
the payment limit may scale back their own participation or avoid the
programs altogether. For example, large farms may register only a portion of
their total operation or elect to install less expensive practices, even when
other practices would be more environmentally effective.
17
Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land: What Challenges Lie Ahead?/ERR-5
Economic Research Service/USDA
Competitive bidding on conservation payments can help
stretch a limited budget to achieve more agri-environ-
mental gain than is possible using a fixed payment. In the
figure, the “S”-shaped curve represents the distribution of
the minimum payment producers would be willing to
accept (WTA) in exchange for installing a practice or
taking some other conservation-related action. The higher
the payment rate (on the horizontal axis), the larger the
proportion of land producers are willing to enroll in the
program (see “Producer Willingness To Accept
Payments,” p. 8, for more details on WTA). When the
payment rate is fixed across producers, the proportion of
acres enrolled is represented by point M and program
expenditure is represented by area A + area B. When
producers bid for payments, a lower bid increases the like-
lihood of being enrolled in the program. If bidding is
competitive and producers are unsure about the level of
bid that will be accepted, they have an incentive to submit
bids that equal their WTA. If so, the cost of funding
conservation action on the proportion of acres represented
by point M is reduced from A+B to A. The change frees
some of the budget to fund additional acres up to point N.
Area C, the cost of funding additional producers, is equal
to area B, the savings from instituting a bidding system.
Savings due to bidding can be large. In the Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), where competition
for enrollment has been very strong, cost-sharing and
incentive payment rates were much lower than maximum
rates when bidding was allowed (1996-2002). The 
average bid on cost-sharing for structural practices was
35 percent of cost, compared with a maximum of 75
percent. For management practices, bids averaged 43
percent of the maximum rate (generally established by
practice and by county). 
Finally, note that bidding alone does not make a program
cost effective. Bidding generates a range of payment rates
for practices. However, to create an environmentally cost-
effective program, bidding can be used in conjunction
with a performance-based enrollment screen to ensure
that producers who do receive higher payments can also











Bidding and BudgetsCosts of Conservation Programs Include
Administration and Monitoring
Environmental cost-effectiveness is not determined exclusively by the costs
and benefits of establishing conservation practices on the ground. In the
program implementation process, applicants fill out forms, administrators
process them, and program managers monitor sites. Transaction costs
include the government’s cost of formulating the program (e.g., establishing
payment rates), the producer’s cost of submitting an application, the govern-
ment’s cost of assessing producer applications, and the government’s cost of
monitoring and enforcement.
Increased emphasis on working land conservation may increase the overall
flexibility of U.S. agri-environmental policy as more producers have access to
more programs. In theory, producers who seek to address resource concerns
can select the lowest cost approach from a number of environmentally effec-
tive alternatives. However, environmental benefits and the cost of imple-
menting a given conservation practice can vary widely by climate, soils,
location (e.g., proximity to water), cropping patterns, and management skills.
If program decisionmakers are to improve their ability to weigh contract
offers using benefits and costs, additional research and/or data may be needed.
The cost of information gathering increases as program managers seek to
adjust program parameters to better differentiate applicants. The gains in cost-
effectiveness need to be weighed against increasing transaction costs.
Environmental benefits are achieved only when producers comply with
contract requirements, which require monitoring. Many irregularities are
inadvertent and can be corrected with the cooperation of the producer. In
some cases, however, penalties may be required. For some, the incentive to
fulfill all contract requirements will partially depend on the likelihood that a
contract will be selected for inspection, the likelihood that a penalty will be
assessed once a violation is detected, and the potential size of the penalty.
Program managers may choose to monitor intensively, visiting many
enrolled farms and thereby maximizing adherence. But this is costly: moni-
toring efforts will entail onfarm visits by qualified personnel who could
otherwise be engaged in conservation planning or technical assistance. On
the other hand, program managers may choose to minimize monitoring,
visiting only a few farms or when there is reason to suspect irregularities. To
a certain degree, it is possible to compensate for a minimal monitoring
effort by increasing both the size and certainty of penalties. Even if detec-
tion is unlikely, the prospect of stiff sanctions may encourage careful
compliance with contract requirements. Of course, stiff penalties may be
unpopular with producers and inadvertent errors are more likely to go
uncorrected with less monitoring. 
In either case, it is important to consider the difficulty of monitoring in deter-
mining practice eligibility, practice-specific payment rates, and the role of
specific practices in contract acceptance criteria. The extent to which practice
implementation and maintenance can be observed varies widely. Consider the
potential tradeoff between nutrient management and conservation buffers in
18
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including reduced application rates and better application timing, are difficult
or impossible to monitor (Johansson, 2002). But nutrient runoff can also be
intercepted before it leaves the field or enters a stream through filter strips,
grassed waterways, or riparian buffers. The existence, adequacy of design, and
maintenance of these buffer practices can be observed more easily than
compliance with nutrient management plans. In both cases, the benefits of
specific practices need to be weighed against their full costs.
Working-Land Payment Programs in
Practice: EQIP and CSP
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conserva-
tion Security Program (CSP) are, at present, the largest U.S. WLPPs. EQIP
and CSP are designed to address similar environmental problems on
working lands, but various program design decisions have largely distin-
guished CSP from EQIP, so that these programs now represent the broad
diversity of program designs that can be encompassed within the definition
of the WLPP (table 2.2).
On one hand, EQIP is similar to previous conservation programs in that
eligibility is broad. Payment incentives (cost-sharing or incentive payments)
are based on the installation or adoption of new conservation practices that
meet existing NRCS standards (the “non-degradation” standard) (see box,
“Environmental Quality Incentives Program”). Producers need not reach any
specific level of conservation effort or stewardship before becoming eligible,
and there is no incentive for whole-farm conservation effort. Enrollment
screening is based on an index that incorporates environmental benefits and
costs. EQIP is heavily focused on livestock-related resource concerns and,
since 2002, is often used to help large livestock operations comply with new
Clean Water Act regulations on waste discharge.
On the other hand, CSP has introduced a number of nontraditional concepts
into the agri-environmental policy debate (see box, “Conservation Security
Program”). Unlike EQIP, CSP eligibility requires a substantial level of stew-
ardship, and participation incentives encourage whole-farm conservation
effort. Soil quality and water quality must be addressed (to existing NRCS
standards) before land can be enrolled in CSP. Stewardship payments are
available based on past conservation efforts. CSP also provides significant
payments for “enhancements,” which, to some extent, encourage producers to
transcend existing conservation standards. Enrollment screening is also based
largely on stewardship and the willingness to pursue conservation effort
beyond minimum program requirements. While many livestock-related prac-
tices can be eligible for CSP, livestock waste management structures and
handling equipment are specifically excluded. Finally, CSP is available
nationally, but only in selected watersheds for any given signup. All 2,100
U.S. watersheds are to be eligible once over an 8-year period (2004-2012).
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Table 2.2—EQIP and CSP designs
Program feature EQIP CSP
Budget 2004 contract obligations totaled $903 mil-
lion. A total of $5.8 billion is authorized for
2002-2007.
2004 contract obligations totaled $35.2 mil-
lion. A total of $6 billion is authorized for
2002-2011.
Conservation standard  Producers must address resource concerns
to standards in existing NRCS handbook
(referred to as “non-degradation”).
Standards in existing handbook ("non-degra-
dation") are minimum.Through enhancement
payments, CSP can encourage producers to
go beyond this standard.
Eligibility • Both crop and livestock production (in
2003, 33% to crop-related practices; 67%
to livestock practices).
• Emphasis on assisting livestock opera-
tions to comply with new Clean Water Act
regulation.
• No previous conservation effort required.
• Only newly installed practices can be
funded.
• Available nationally.
• All agricultural land (in 2004, 67% to crop-
land; 33% to range and pasture land).
• Animal waste storage or treatment facili-
ties are not eligible.
• Soil and water quality concerns must be
addressed before land can be enrolled in
CSP.
• Existing practices eligible for payments.
• Available nationally, but only in selected
watersheds for any given signup. All 2,100
U.S. watersheds to be eligible once during
8-year period.
Enrollment screen Performance-based “offer index.” “Category” system based on level of conser-
vation effort above minimum requirement.
Participation incentives Fixed payments:
• Cost sharing (typically 50%) on structural
and vegetative practices;
• Incentive payments for management 
practices.
No annual payment limitation.The sum of all
EQIP payments to an individual or entity can-
not exceed $450,000.
Fixed payments:
• Stewardship and existing practice pay-
ment based on land rental rates.
• Cost-sharing for new practices.
Performance-based payments:
• Enhancements based, in part, on environ-
mental performance
Payments limited by tier:
Tier 1 = $20,000 max annual payment
Tier 2 = $35,000 max annual payment
Tier 3 = $40,000 max annual payment.21
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EQIP was established by the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improve-
ment and Reform Act as an innovative voluntary conservation
program to provide assistance to farmers who adopt conservation
practices. Since its creation in 1996, EQIP has provided cost-
share and incentive payments for conservation practices. EQIP
contracts specify a conservation plan, which outlines what
changes in farming practices are planned and how these changes
address environmental concerns in the area. 
Budget—The initial funding level of $200 million annually was
insufficient to meet demand early on, with 65 to 70 percent of
applications turned down in the first 2 years. This rejection rate
discouraged subsequent farmers from applying, as indicated by a
steady reduction in the number of applicants from 1997 to 2001.
The Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act of 2002
authorized funding at a total of $5.8 billion from 2002 through
2007, nearly a five-fold increase in annual funding. The
increased budget, combined with more inclusive eligibility
criteria for practices and the allowance of contracts up to
$450,000, attracted a broader pool of applicants than previously.
Applications doubled from 2001 to 2002, maintaining the
competitiveness of the enrollment process. 
Eligibility—Both crop and livestock producers are eligible for
EQIP. Currently, 60 percent of EQIP funds are designated to
address livestock-related resource concerns. Over 250 accept-
able conservation practices are eligible for EQIP funding. Such
flexibility enables a more efficient addressing of resource
concerns. If the set of eligible practices is limited, practices
appropriate to some situations or regions may be excluded,
leading to an outcome that is less cost effective. 
As of 2002, EQIP no longer limits eligibility for funding of waste
treatment structures to smaller animal feeding operations (fewer
than 1,000 animal units). Water quality may benefit by allowing
larger animal facilities to compete for program funds. Many of
these larger facilities face new Federal water quality regulations,
and EQIP funds may be used to help producers comply. (One of
the objectives set out for EQIP in both the 1996 and 2002 Farm
Acts is to provide assistance to “help farmers and ranchers meet
Federal, State, Tribal, and local environmental requirements.”)
Enrollment Screens—The enrollment screens used in EQIP
have changed over the program's life. Initially (as stated in the
1996 FAIR Act), EQIP's principal objective was to achieve the
greatest possible environmental benefits per dollar of program
expenditure. Under the 1996 program, at least 65 percent of
EQIP funds had to be allocated to specially targeted priority
areas, with local workgroups determining priority resource
concerns and allocating funds. Nearly 41 percent of all appli-
cants within a priority area were accepted, versus 24 percent
outside a priority area. Furthermore, an “offer index” was
calculated by NRCS for each proposed conservation plan by
considering the environmental benefits and the cost-share
request for each practice. Applications were ranked according
to this offer index. In 2002, Congress de-emphasized benefit-
cost targeting by eliminating the requirement to “maximize net
environmental benefits per dollar expended” and eliminated
priority areas. The offer index was retained. 
Participation Incentives—EQIP offers contracts ranging from 1
year (after the implementation of the last scheduled practices) to
10 years. These contracts provide fixed-rate payments (incentive
payments and fixed cost-shares) to implement new conservation
practices. By funding conservation practices yet to be intro-
duced, all EQIP funds are meant to actively contribute to envi-
ronmental improvement. 
For structural and vegetative practices, farmers are reimbursed
a share of their costs not to exceed 75 percent (90 percent for
limited-resource and beginning farmers and ranchers).
However, most practices will be cost-shared at 50 percent.
Cost-shares between 50 and 75 percent require special
approval by State conservationists, but can be provided on
those practices deemed most effective at addressing local
resource concerns. 
For management practices, EQIP incentive payments may be
provided for up to 3 years. These payments are set at the local or
State level by considering the amount necessary to encourage
producers to participate, given additional costs or risks incurred
by the producer, including lost production. 
The 2002 FSRI Act eliminated the “bid down” procedures,
by which operators could improve the offer index of their
applications by reducing the amount of payment they would
accept. Between 1996 and 2002, when bidding procedures
were in place, the overall national average cost share rate
was 35 percent for structural practices and incentives
payments were, on average, 43 percent of maximum rates.
The elimination of bidding may increase the cost of indi-
vidual EQIP contracts, reducing the level of conservation
that can be funded with a given budget. 
The FSRI Act also increased the flexibility of EQIP contract
design. It increased the maximum payment to $450,000 for
all contracts held by a producer through 2007, and elimi-
nated the limitation on annual payments. The 2002 FSRI Act
also allows for contracts to expire 1 year after the date of the
installation of the last practice, even though practices have to
be maintained. And rules now allow for more than one
contract per tract. These changes allow more environmental
concerns to be addressed, appeal to large-scale producers
who may have felt that previous payments were insufficient,
and reduce the risk of long-term contractual obligations. 
Implementation—The EQIP competitive bidding process
before 2002 may have induced some farmers to enter into an
untenable agreement due to overcompetitive bidding. The
potential remorse was compounded by the limited enforcement
capabilities of the conservation authority to ensure that the
contract was carried out in its entirety. In fact, 17 percent of the
contracts were not being implemented in full due to structural
problems with the program incentives (Cattaneo, 2003). These
contract withdrawals often resulted in the loss of funds allo-
cated to these practices. (Funds for canceled practices are now
recycled by the program, so the negative impact of cancella-
tions is more limited.)
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The Conservation Security Program (CSP) may be the first in
a new generation of conservation policy. As structured by
Congress, CSP could fill the traditional role of conservation
programs—providing incentives for improving the environ-
mental performance of farms—and some not-so-traditional
roles—such as providing ongoing rewards for good environ-
mental performance. CSP will also stress “enhancements.”
Enhancements could be used for a number of purposes,
including addressing local resource concerns. Unlike previous
programs, however, some enhancement payments will
encourage the adoption of practices or activities that go
beyond minimum standards of addressing a specific resource
concern (e.g., soil quality) as defined in the NRCS Field Office
Technical Guide (USDA-NRCS, 2004a). To address a soil
quality concern, for example, producers are required to reduce
soil erosion to at least the soil loss tolerance (“T”) level.
Through enhancements, however, CSP could encourage
producers to reduce erosion to even lower levels or in other
ways improve the quality of their soils. 
Budget—CSP was originally enacted as an entitlement,
meaning that all eligible producers who wished to participate
would be enrolled. However, CSP funding was capped at $41
million in fiscal year 2004, limiting implementation to 18
selected watersheds. In 2005, CSP funding is $202 million and
signup will encompass 220 watersheds. Unless and until the
budget cap is lifted, CSP enrollment is effectively a competi-
tive program—producers' participation offers can be rejected. 
Eligibility—CSP eligibility is broad in terms of producers and
land types—cropland, pasture, and range—but is open only to
producers who have already addressed soil quality and water
quality concerns on at least part of their agricultural opera-
tions. Only those acres where these resource concerns have
been addressed can be enrolled in CSP. For any given signup
period, CSP eligibility is also limited to a set of selected water-
sheds. NRCS will enroll producers in 220 watersheds in 2005,
with plans to make all 2,100 U.S. watersheds eligible for CSP
enrollment once over the next 8 years. Both crop and livestock
operations are eligible, but livestock waste management facil-
ities are explicitly excluded from CSP. 
Enrollment Screens—In CSP, applicants are ranked by cate-
gories based stewardship and on their willingness to take on
additional conservation effort during the contract. In 2004,
producers were placed in the lowest category (least likely to be
enrolled) if they met only the basic requirements of the
program (i.e., have addressed soil and water quality concerns).
In the highest category, producers agreed to implement
multiple enhancement practices and activities. The category
system may or may not be used in any given signup,
depending on the number of applicants and the CSP budget. 
Participation Incentives—In CSP, eligible producers can
participate in one of three CSP “tiers,” based on the extent to
which the entire farm and all associated resource concerns are
addressed. Higher tiers require a greater minimum level of
conservation effort but also offer higher payments. Minimum
conservation requirements, by tier, include:
• In tier I, producers may enroll that portion of their farm
on which soil and water quality concerns have been
addressed at least to existing handbook standards. Tier I
contracts are for 5 years and can be renewed only if the
producer expands conservation efforts to a larger share of
the farm or additional resource concerns.
• For tier II, producers must address soil and water quality
concerns on their entire farm. Contracts are for 5-10 years
and can be renewed without further action.
• In tier III, producers must address all resource concerns
on all land in the farming operation. Tier III contracts are
for 5-10 years and can be renewed without further action.
CSP offers several types of payment, some of which reward
past stewardship and help producers maintain previously
installed practices. “Stewardship” and “existing practice”
payments are based, roughly, on a percentage of the county
average rental rate for the specific type of land involved (rental
rate data from several sources were combined by USDA, then
adjusted to ensure consistency and equity at local and regional
levels). For the 2005 CSP signup, stewardship payments are
equal to 11.25 percent, 5.0 percent, and 1.25 percent of these
rates for tier III, tier II, and tier I contracts, respectively. Where
the CSP stewardship rate is $75 per acre, for example, the
annual stewardship payments—paid in each year of the
contract—would be $8.44, $5.63, and $0.94 per enrolled acre,
for tiers III, II, and I. Existing practice payments, which are
designed to ensure maintenance of previously installed prac-
tices, would be 25 percent of the stewardship payment. 
New practices can be cost-shared through CSP at a rate of up
to 50 percent. Limited resource farmers and beginning farmers
may be eligible for higher cost-share rates. For example,
producers may install or adopt new practices as part of a CSP
contract in which they agree to move to a higher tier. These
payments made up only a very small portion of overall CSP
payments in 2004.
Finally, payments for environmental “enhancements”
accounted for about two-thirds of all CSP payments in 2004.
Enhancements address local resource concerns (e.g., resource
concerns other than the nationally significant concerns of soil
quality and water quality) and encourage practices or activities
that improve or enhance resource quality beyond the minimum
(non-degradation) standard. In a number of cases, enhance-
ment payments are based not on cost but on environmental
performance as measured by indices like the soil condition
index. Payments are to be based on the improvement in index
values, ensuring that payments reflect likely environmental
gains. 
Overall payments (stewardship, existing practice, and
enhancements) are limited to $20,000 per year per farm in tier
I, $35,000 in tier II, and $45,000 in tier III. Stewardship
payments are also limited to $5,000 per year for farms in tier
I, $10,500 in tier II, and $13,500 in tier III. 
Conservation Security Program (CSP)2See Appendix B (www.ers.usda.




Recent implementation of working-land payment programs and new flexi-
bility in their design raise many questions. To what degree can EQIP or CSP
improve producers’ environmental performance? What are the tradeoffs
between improving the environment and supporting farm incomes? How
might changes in these programs, such as budget levels or enrollment
options, affect their outcomes? Very little data are available to assess the
cost-effectiveness of programs such as EQIP or CSP. Instead, simulation
models can illustrate the nature of tradeoffs implied by different program
design decisions. Given the importance of these questions and the scarcity
of data, this chapter uses empirical simulations to examine how alternative
designs for working-land payment programs affect returns to agricultural




The process of cultivating crops generally results in the discharge of pollu-
tants into water and air, which may cause human or ecological damage.1
Working-land payment programs are designed to reduce the discharge of
pollutants by encouraging use of “better” management techniques, such as
conservation tillage and reduced fertilizer applications. Cost-effective WLPP
design requires a measure of how these better practices affect the environ-
ment. Estimating one environmental impact is difficult by itself, but when
the desire is to address multiple environmental criteria, administering
program payments cost effectively becomes even more complicated. To
measure overall changes to the environment resulting from WLPPs, we use
an Aggregate Environmental Index (AEI). This index is similar to the Envi-
ronmental Benefits Index used by USDA to assess CRP contracts. 
To construct the AEI, we link crop management practices and regional
topography to estimate a cropping system’s impact on the resource concerns
deemed most harmful to regional ecosystems. We denote the cropping
systems with a subscript “i,” resource concern with a subscript “j,” and
region with a subscript “k.” This impact factor is denoted Ikji. We consider
nine resource concerns: nitrogen discharged to surface waters, nitrogen
leached into ground water, phosphorus discharged into surface waters, pesti-
cides discharged into surface waters, pesticides leached into ground water,
sediment eroded into surface waters, soil eroded via the wind into the
atmosphere, carbon emitted into the atmosphere, and loss in long-term soil
productivity.2 The individual impact factors are used to generate an Aggre-
gate Environmental Index score, AEIki, reflecting the impact of that system
on the environment as a whole: AEIki  = f(Ikji). Several formats have been
used in the past to construct such measures of environmental quality. This
report uses a weighted sum of the individual environmental indicators:
1Although pasture and rangeland
are also eligible for enrollment in
existing WLPPs, we focus our analysis
on cultivated cropland.
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concerns. Ideally, the weights chosen would reflect socio-economic prefer-
ences for mitigating the various pollutants (Heimlich, 1994). We construct
several different weighting schemes (see box, “Weighting Multiple Environ-
mental Criteria”), but for most of our analysis we use weights based on how
EQIP contracts have valued different resource concerns in different regions. 
Constructing Alternative 
WLPP Designs
We start with six hypothetical working-land payment programs (table 3.1).
Each program contains one or more of the design features discussed in
earlier chapters—whether previous conservation efforts are rewarded in or
required for participation, whether incentives are based on practices or on
performance, and whether farmers are screened according to the relative
benefits and costs of their WLPP contract. 
To compare alternative designs, we hold several program features constant.
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Weighting Multiple Environmental Criteria
Developing weights that reflect society's preference for different environ-
mental benefits is difficult. Many studies ask respondents how much they are
willing to pay for a reduction in their exposure to certain chemicals, such as
nitrates in drinking water supplies (Crutchfield et al., 1997). Others determine
how valuable variable recreation opportunities are to the public (e.g., Feather
et al., 1999) or how asset values are affected by variable environmental quality
(e.g., Kim et al., 2003). 
However, in the absence of national or local surveys that can be applied across
multiple environmental criteria, we use data about how policymakers have
valued past efforts at addressing multiple environmental criteria. How public
preferences translate into policymaker expenditures and mandates is well
documented (Variyam and Jordan, 2001; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Dixit et
al., 1997; Crémer and Palfrey, 2002). Looking explicitly at conservation
programs Bastos and Lichtenberg (2001) noted that incentive payments are
linked to public preferences for environmental quality. Moreover, while the
link between policy expenditures for working-land payment programs, envi-
ronmental standards, and public preferences may not be completely trans-
parent, Reichelderfer and Boggess (1998) noted that policymakers could learn
and improve the cost-effectiveness of conservation program controls. 
Therefore, we use stated weights taken from the Conservation Reserve
Program's Environmental Benefits Index and expenditure data from EQIP
contracts to essentially “reveal the preference” of policymakers in reducing
one pollutant vis-à-vis another. This method is appropriate for two reasons.
First, it shows how multiple environmental criteria are valued under voluntary
conservation programs. Second, CRP and EQIP do not weight actual physical
measures of pollutant abatement, but weight management practices more or
less depending upon how they are expected to result in environmental benefits,
which is how we have constructed the Aggregate Environmental Index. See
Web Appendix B (www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err5) for more details.run multiple simulations for each program at different budget levels in order
to map aggregate payments to environmental performance. All cropland
currently under production is assumed eligible for program participation,
and this acreage is kept constant throughout our modeling horizon. Since
this report examines working-land payment programs, we do not examine
program payments for enhanced environmental performance on land retired
from production. Also, CSP limits eligible cropland to land that had been
cropped prior to enrollment. Our model does not incorporate pasture or
rangeland, although we recognize that these lands can be enrolled in either
EQIP or CSP.3
Practice-Based Policies. Practice-based payments are fixed-rate incentive
payments to producers who implement eligible conservation practices.
Producers who can implement such practices at least cost are likely to
benefit most from these incentives, regardless of the amount of environ-
mental benefits achieved. Payments for practices deemed environmentally
beneficial are modeled under Good-Act (a program that rewards ongoing
and new conservation efforts) and Practice (a program that rewards only
new conservation efforts). Here, we model those management practices that
are intended to reduce soil erosion and improve water quality. They include
cropping systems that employ conservation tillage, nutrient management,
and conservation rotations. Given a range of potential regional payments for
these management practices, the practice-based programs are simulated
under various regional budgets.4
Under the hypothetical Good-Act program, eligibility for program payments
does not discriminate between past or new conservation. Eligibility is
constrained to apply to only those cropland acres that have been in active
production. Therefore, eligible stewards who essentially have a zero WTA
for their practices will be the first to accept program payments, limited by a
regional budget. Once all eligible old practices have received program
payments, new eligible practices are considered for participation.
3See Web Appendix A www.ers.
usda.gov/publications/err5/ for addi-
tional details of policy simulations.
4These practices represent approxi-
mately 90 percent of the nonlivestock,
nonstructural EQIP contracts between
1997 and 2000 (FSA-EQIP database).
Because the practice-based programs
are less flexible than are the perform-
ance-based programs (fewer ways for
producers to earn program payments),
a regional budget restriction is imposed
on the distribution of payments to pro-
ducers similar to the distributional allo-
cations of the EQIP budget. This
ensures program participation will
occur across all regions, even at rela-
tively low program budgets. We do not
use regional budget constraints for the
performance-based simulations. There,
producers can receive payments for
any improvement in environmental per-
formance regardless of the practice
adopted, so participation is less likely
to favor one region over another. See
Web Appendix A www.ers.
usda.gov/publications/err5/ for details.
25
Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land: What Challenges Lie Ahead?/ERR-5
Economic Research Service/USDA










(1) Good-Act (ongoing and new
practice adoption) Regional X
(2) Practice (new practice adoption) Regional 
Performance-Based
(3) Performance (new performance standard) National
(4) Hurdle-Low (ongoing performance
above low reference level)
National X
(5) Hurdle-High (ongoing performance
above high reference level) 
National X
(6) Bid (new performance standard) National XNext, a practice-based program (Practice) without stewardship payments is
simulated using the same program payments, where eligibility is strictly
limited to new adoption of practices. Stricter eligibility is likely to improve
environmental cost-effectiveness, but to the extent that the program
payments (including stewardship payments) do not completely cover imple-
mentation costs, the program will not provide as much income support as
Good-Act. As before, new production acres are not eligible for payments
under this program. These depictions of two different practice-based
programs illustrate the tradeoff between providing stewardship payments
and providing payments for newly adopted practices.
Performance-Based Policies. Performance-based policies use either
performance-based payments or bid-based payments in conjunction with
performance-based screens to steer participation toward producers who can
deliver environmental gain at low cost. For the performance-based
scenarios, payments are based on changes to the environment as measured
using the Aggregate Environmental Index; i.e., payments received by partic-
ipants are modeled as a function of physical effects that will likely affect
environmental performance. Under the first performance-based program
(Performance), the policymaker establishes a fixed price for environmental
performance and any producer is eligible for payments based on the degree
to which environmental performance increases. There are no stewardship
payments attached to these contracts. 
The next performance-based program (Bid) steers participation toward the
same producers as in Performance, but at a lower cost using competitive
bidding and performance-based screens. In these scenarios, the simulation
model mimics a program in which (1) producers submit bids that include
both the actions to be undertaken and the level of payment they would
accept, and (2) bids are accepted or rejected on the basis of projected envi-
ronmental benefits (again measured by the AEI) and costs. Here, producers
submit bids for financial assistance that are at or near their WTA, mini-
mizing the program expenditure necessary to gain their participation. Those
producers who can deliver the most environmental gain per dollar will be
selected for participation, up to limits imposed by the program budget. 
Another type of performance-based program combines performance-based
payments with stewardship payments, but limits eligibility to producers who
have already achieved environmental performance above a fixed “reference
level” (see Claassen et al., 2001; Johansson et al., 2002). We examine two
reference levels. The first reference level (measured using the AEI) is set
relatively low (Hurdle-L), such that 33 percent of farms (38 percent of
current acres) are eligible for program payments even if they do not engage
in new conservation efforts. The second reference level (Hurdle-H) is set
higher, such that only 25 percent of farms, representing 20 percent of
current acres, are eligible to receive payments without implementing new
conservation practices. Here, the program decisionmaker sets a given price
for each AEI point generated above the reference level, and then opens the
program for enrollment. 
Simulating Producers’Adjustments to Policy. Our model simulates how
different agri-environmental program designs can encourage farmers to alter
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production and, as a result, commodity prices. An environmental process
model estimates the environmental changes flowing from adjustments to
cropping and management practices prompted by program payments.
Linking production practices (such as crop rotation, irrigation, tillage, and
fertilizer application rate) to an environmental model in this fashion illus-
trates how different WLPP designs result in different economic and environ-
mental effects across sectors and regions (fig. 3.1).5 We examine these
effects in the medium run (e.g., 5-10 years), meaning that we model
changes in price and production levels, but we assume that technology (e.g.,
types of cropping systems) and the resource base (e.g., the amount of land
in crop production) are constant. 
You Get What You Pay For
For a given budget, the Performance and Bid programs achieve much greater
improvements in environmental performance than the practice-based
programs. Whereas practice-based payments provide fixed payments for
eligible practices, performance-based programs link either payment amounts
or the likelihood of participation to a practice’s efficacy at, say, reducing soil
erosion or pesticide leaching. In this manner, practices that most improve
environmental performance will receive the highest payment or will be most
likely to be enrolled, while those practices that marginally improve environ-
mental performance will receive a lower payment or will be less likely to be
enrolled. 
Increasing Costs of Environmental Performance. At the national level, as
producers improve environmental performance on cropland, it becomes more
costly and requires more program payments for each additional unit of
performance (fig. 3.2). Program designs do differ in the degree to which
increasing environmental performance is associated with progressively higher
5For a more detailed description of
the modeling, see Web Appendix A
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err5/.
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Baseline agricultural production activities for crops and animals
Changes in crop mix, production practices, input use
WLPP policy
designs
Changes in regional environmental
quality
Changes in returns to agricultural
production, by region and sector
Price effectsprogram payments. For example, the more constrained payments are, the less
likely they will be sufficient to cover producers’WTA for new practices.
However, producers’WTA for old practices is essentially zero, which means
the provision of stewardship payments increases the cost of the program per
environmental increment if old and new practices compete for payments,
especially at lower budget levels. Results show that at the $250-million level,
Practice (where only new practices are eligible) achieves 12 times the
improvements in environmental performance achieved by Good-Act (a
program that rewards both new and old practices). At the $500-million level,
Practice is still four times more cost effective than Good-Act. This illustrates
that, under our depiction of stewardship payments, at lower budget levels a
larger proportion of funds is devoted to rewarding past stewardship than is
directed toward new conservation efforts. Under other designs, program deci-
sionmakers might fix the percentage of the program budget that is to be set
aside for stewardship payments and for new conservation efforts. 
Unless stewardship payments are positively correlated with potential for
achieving new environmental benefits and negatively correlated with
producer WTA for taking the necessary action, they do little to encourage
participation among producers who could (in addition to a history of good
stewardship) take additional actions to improve environmental quality. As
configured in our model and in the Conservation Security Program, steward-
ship payments are based on land rental rates, which may be unrelated to
either environmental benefits or conservation costs.6 Such payments differ
from those of other working-land payment programs, which base payments
primarily on practice installation or adoption cost. Because stewardship and
existing-practice payments are tied directly to land rental rates, producers
have the greatest incentive to participate when land rent is high and the cost
of addressing resource concerns is low. Given this incentive structure, a
CSP-type program will direct participation incentives toward high-benefit,
low-cost producers, land, and practices only to the extent that environmental
benefits are positively correlated with land rents used to establish the base
payment and negatively correlated with conservation costs, which is
unlikely (see “Correlating Costs, Benefits, and Rental Rates,” p. 15).
6See Web Appendix C www.ers.
usda.gov/publications/err5/ for more
discussion of correlating costs, bene-
fits, and rental rates.
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Figure 3.2
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Hurdle-HThe performance-based, hurdle programs mimic a good-actor type of
program by providing payments for cropping systems already performing
above the reference level. The higher the reference level, the less likely
producers will receive payments based on what they are already doing.
However, the higher the reference level, the fewer ways there are for
producers to reach the hurdle. This loss in flexibility will also inflate the
cost of the program. Yet, because payments are based on performance, they
are more cost-effective than Good-Act. They achieve improvements in envi-
ronmental performance at costs similar to the Practice program. 
Why Bidding Increases Cost-
Effectiveness
By comparison, the performance-based programs, Performance and Bid,
produce more environmental gain per dollar of program expenditure (i.e.,
flatter supply curves for environmental benefits—fig. 3.2) than the other
program designs. Payments for Performance are equal to a fixed payment per
point multiplied by the amount of environmental benefits generated by the
contract, as measured by the AEI. For example, a Performance payment of $5
per AEI point would result in a 10-percent increase in environmental perform-
ance (or 110 million AEI points) from current levels (fig. 3.3). The annual
program payments under Performance would be approximately $550 million
(areas A+B in fig. 3.3). When producers bid for payments, they can increase
the likelihood of being enrolled in the program by submitting a low bid. If
program enrollment is competitive, producers have incentive to submit bids
that equal their WTA. We take cost as a proxy for WTA, so that aggregate
payments in Bid are equal to the area under the payment—marginal benefits
curve, or the shaded triangle (B) in fig. 3.3, approximately $275 million. 
Environmental Cost-Effectiveness. Another way to compare programs is to
fix the budget and measure environmental cost-effectiveness (table 3.3).
Holding the budget fixed at approximately $1 billion,7 we see that a
performance-based program with bid-down provisions (Bid) could improve
7This is roughly equal to projected
average annual EQIP expenditures
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Aenvironmental performance (as measured by the AEI) by more than 15
percent over current production patterns. Without the bid-down provisions,
such a program (Performance) could improve environmental performance
by nearly 12 percent, relative to base production patterns. A practice-based
program with good-actor payments (Good-Act) might increase environ-
mental performance by about 1 percent. However, without stewardship
payments, a practice-based working-lands program (Practice) might
enhance environmental performance by about 5.6 percent.8 Both of the
hurdle programs (Hurdle-H and Hurdle-L) have lower environmental cost-
effectiveness than Practice at this budget because they pay for already
existing conservation practices. 
This highlights the fact that, overall, programs that pay for practices already
established are generally less cost-effective than those that do not. A
performance-based program with bidding provisions achieves environmental
improvements at an average cost of $6 per aggregate environmental point;
without the bidding provision, the average cost of enhancing environmental
performance by one point increases to $8. The average cost under a practice-
based program without stewardship provisions more than doubles to $17 per
point, and increases to $73 per point when “good actors” are eligible for
payments based on past implementation of conservation practices.
These results also show how improvements in environmental performance
vary across program designs and across regions. For example, under the Bid
program, the Northern Plains, Mountain, and Delta regions improve envi-
ronmental performance the most, whereas under Good-Act, the Southeast,
Delta, and Southern Plains improve environmental performance most.
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Table 3.3—Environmental performance at the $1-billion level
Region1 Good-Act  Hurdle-L Hurdle-H Practice Performance Bid
% Increase in environmental performance
Northeast 0.9 1.2 2.9 0.8 4.3 6.3
Lake States 0.0 0.3 1.0 4.1 8.7 15.4
Corn Belt 0.0 8.0 8.5 10.3 12.0 13.2
Northern Plains 0.5 0.8 2.3 2.2 12.4 17.4
Appalachia 0.0 2.4 4.0 6.4 11.5 13.9
Southeast 5.8 1.8 1.8 5.7 9.3 15.2
Delta States 5.8 2.4 2.4 5.8 15.5 19.9
Southern Plains 4.3 2.1 4.4 4.3 10.3 15.0
Mountain 2.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 14.8 20.9
Pacific 4.1 1.1 7.0 4.1 7.8 11.9
United States 1.3 3.3 4.4 5.6 11.7 15.5
1Northeast = CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PN, RI, VT; Lake States = MI, MN, WI; Corn
Belt = IA, IL, IN, MO, OH; Northern Plains = KS, ND, NE, SD; Appalachia = KY, NC, TN, VA,
WV; Southeast = AL, FL, GA, SC; Delta States = AR, LA, MS; Southern Plains = OK, TX;
Mountain = AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY; Pacific = CA, OR, WA.
8Two additional policies were con-
sidered, whereby the constraints on the
regional distribution of practice-based
payments were dropped. Under the
altered Good-Act program, there is no
improvement in environmental per-
formance; i.e., eligible good actors
soak up the entire $1-billion budget.
Under the altered Practice program,
cost-effectiveness is marginally higher.Equity Concerns May Limit 
Cost-Effectiveness
Payments under the two practice-based programs are subject to regional
budget constraints based on historic EQIP payments (see Web Appendix A
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err5/ for additional details). This ensures that
all regions will have participants, even at low national budget levels.
However, it also lowers the cost-effectiveness of these programs. For
example, under Good-Act, when producers are eligible for stewardship
payments, not all eligible acres are able to participate in the program at lower
budgets (fig. 3.4). The regions with the highest demand for participation,
given fixed regional budgets, are the Corn Belt and Lake State regions
because there are already many producers using payment-eligible practices.
Even at $1 billion, acres that are eligible for stewardship payments are
unable to participate, which indicates that in these regions no new practices
are being adopted. It is only at $1.5 billion in funding that all eligible acres
in these regions are able to receive stewardship payments. When all
producers receive payments for practices they are doing already, the program
can start to encourage the adoption of new practices.
Also, practice-based payments are differentiated by region, but the ability of
funded practices to produce environmental benefits is not homogenous
within a region or across regions. Performance-based programs have more
potential to increase environmental performance on working lands. By
basing payments on estimated environmental performance rather than on
practices, they account for dissimilarity in practices and regions. Therefore,
certain regions will have lower costs of generating benefits than others. For
example, under the Performance scenario, producers in the Northern Plains
are able to improve environmental performance at least cost, whereas the
costs of improvement are highest in the Northeast (fig. 3.5). 
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Figure 3.4
Percentage of eligible acres in the Lake States and Corn Belt that 
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How the aggregate environmental index is created will also affect who
participates in the performance-based programs. Until this point in our
analysis, environmental performance has been measured using an AEI
derived from regional EQIP weights. However, we devised five other
weighting schemes for use in constructing the AEI to illustrate how environ-
mental performance might be influenced by program decisionmakers’ pref-
erences across resource concerns (table 3.4). The first three schemes are
derived from the CRP: national-level weights, regional weights incorpo-
rating environmental preferences, and regional weights without soil produc-
tivity. The fourth and fifth weighting schemes are derived from national and
regional expenditures on EQIP contracts. The sixth scheme weights all envi-
ronmental criteria equally across all regions.9
We compare these six weighting schemes under the Performance design
holding the budget fixed at $1 billion (table 3.5). Under all weighting
schemes, the improvements in environmental performance are quite similar
when aggregated to the national level. However, the regional CRP weights
(scheme 2) enhance environmental performance more than the national CRP
weights (except for wind erosion). Thus, a national preference for reduced
wind erosion may diminish the potential to address other resource concerns,
at least in aggregate. However, with EQIP-derived weights (except for pesti-
cide runoff), focusing on regional preferences may impair overall reductions
at the national level.10
Some argue that soil productivity is not a resource concern because
producers are self-motivated in that respect (Trimble and Crosson, 2000).
What might result if soil productivity was not directly rewarded under such
programs? One way to look at this is to give soil productivity loss a zero
weight (scheme 3). Similarly, under a simple uniform weighting scheme
(scheme 6), the weight on soil productivity is identical to those of the other
indicators; i.e., it receives a lower weight than in four other weighting
9See box, “Weighting Multiple
Environmental Criteria,” p. 24, and
Web Appendix B www.ers.
usda.gov/publications/err5/ for more
details of these weights.
10These comparisons might not
hold if the other practices that are eli-
gible under EQIP, including those for
livestock producers, were included in
the analysis.
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Figure 3.5
With regional EQIP weights, cost of improving environmental 
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Northern Plainsschemes. As might be expected, reductions in soil productivity loss under
these two weighting schemes are less than under the other weighting
schemes, albeit still positive.11
Even though aggregate improvements in environmental performance are
similar at the national level, regional results are more likely to depend upon
the weights chosen. For example, if the weights chosen for environmental
quality are developed using regional preferences for environmental quality,
improvements in regions with higher population densities will be valued
more than in regions with low population densities. This is evident in
scheme 2, a performance-based program simulated using regional CRP
weights (fig. 3.6). Under the assumption of population-based value, the
Northeast is able to provide improvements in environmental performance at
lowest cost; the highest cost regions are the Northern Plains and Southern
Plains. The order of regional cost-effectiveness in achieving environmental
improvements is essentially reversed, compared with regional EQIP weights
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Table 3.5—Effect of weights on environmental indicators1
Reductions under alternative 
weighting schemes2
Environmental indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6
Percent
Sheet and rill erosion 15 17 11 17 17 16
Nitrogen to ground water 14 18 14 16 14 13
Nitrogen to surface waters 12 13 9 14 13 12
Phosphorus to surface waters 15 16 10 16 15 14
Loss in soil productivity 295 307 57 350 323 176
Wind erosion 21 19 16 21 21 17
Carbon emissions 8 8 6 8 7 7
Pesticides to surface waters 4 8 8 6 7 13
Pesticides to ground water 8 13 9 10 9 12
1Here, estimated levels of pollutants are compared to base levels. See appendix table B-1 for
base levels of annual discharge, leaching, and emissions.
2No. 1 = national weights from the CRP; No. 2 = regional CRP weights; No. 3 = Regional CRP
without soil productivity weight; No. 4 = national EQIP weights; No. 5 = regional EQIP weights;
No. 6 = uniform weights.
Table 3.4—Options for weighting multiple environmental criteria
Weighting schemes Description
1 National-level weights taken from the Conservation 
Reserve Program’s Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)
2 Regional-level weights generated by applying regional 
values for environmental benefits to the national-level EBI
weights (above)
3 As above, with a zero weight on soil productivity
4 National-level weights derived from aggregate EQIP
expenditures
5 Regional-level weights derived from regional EQIP 
expenditures
6 Uniform weights across regions and indicators
11When the percentage reduction in
lost soil productivity exceeds 100, a
soil productivity gain is indicated; i.e.,
when compared to baseline losses in
long-term soil productivity, adjusted
production patterns actually increased
soil productivity.(see fig. 3.5), which reflect regional expenditures on different resource
concerns and not regional differences in the value of environmental quality
improvement.
Different Programs Have Different
Economic Impacts
Alternative program designs (including good-actor, hurdle rates, and bidding
provisions) will affect returns to production, production levels, and prices
differently. For example, programs that reward reduced soil erosion may
also induce a change in residue management and the mix of crop rotations
in a particular region, such as increased use of no-till cultivation. Such
changes will affect crop yields and crop prices, and ultimately will result in
a new equilibrium between crop and livestock supply and their demand
across regions and sectors. We use our simulation model of regional agricul-
tural production and consumption to examine the economic implications of
new production and consumption patterns from different program designs. 
Among the practice-based programs, Good-Act has smaller impacts on crop
production than Practice, simply because most of the budget goes toward
stewardship payments and no change in practices or production is required
to receive program payments. On the other hand, bidding provisions should
induce more crop adjustments than a fixed-rate performance-based program
under equally funded programs. This is because the program payments are
devoted entirely to paying producers’WTA for improvements in environ-
mental performance. By contrast, under a fixed-rate, performance-based
program such as Performance, producers can still receive payments that
exceed their WTA (see fig. 3.3).
All WLPPs will influence returns to the livestock sector via their effects on
feed crop supply and prices. Similarly, changes in commodity production
will affect consumers’well-being; prices will change for commodities based
on increasing or decreasing returns to agricultural production, and consumers
34
Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land: What Challenges Lie Ahead?/ERR-5
Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 3.6
With regional CRP weights, cost of improving environmental 
performance in the Northern Plains and Northeast under a 
performance-based program with regional CRP weights
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Northern Plainswill end up paying more or less for foodstuffs. Moreover, taxpayers fund
these programs, which is also an important element in the final calculus.
Because performance-based programs result in more changes to manage-
ment practices, the economic impacts on all sectors are much more
pronounced under the performance-based than practice-based programs
(table 3.6) for a given budget ($1 billion). Under practice-based programs,
higher returns to agricultural production result mainly from program
payments (i.e., returns to crop production increase just above $1 billion), not
from increased commodity prices, and thus cost taxpayers roughly the price
of the working-land payment programs. That said, returns to agriculture
increase under all the programs by more than the $1 billion in program
payments. Still, not all sectors benefit from these programs. While crop
producers benefit in general from practice- or performance-based programs,
livestock producers and consumers do not.12
The returns to crop production under a $1-billion performance-based
program would increase by nearly $2.6 billion. This includes the $1 billion
in payments for conservation efforts, implying that an additional $1.6 billion
accrues to crop producers based on changes in prices, production costs, and
production levels. Livestock producers would face higher prices for their
feed material, resulting in a decrease in overall returns by $400 million. This
is partially due to a reduction in feed crop production13 and higher feed
prices for livestock and poultry producers. Returns to agricultural produc-
tion increase by nearly $2.2 billion. Still, overall losses are $331 million,
reflecting lost consumer surplus due to higher prices. 
To calculate the net effect on society, that loss of $331 million must be
weighed against the value of a 12-percent improvement in environmental
performance on working cropland (see table 3.3). Underlying this 12-
percent improvement in environmental performance is an estimated 17-
percent reduction in sheet and rill erosion—about 36 million tons (table 3.5,
column 5). A conservative estimate of the benefit of reducing sheet and rill
erosion at the edge of the field is about $2 per ton.14 The estimated 36-
million-ton reduction to instream sediment loads from sheet and rill erosion
results from reducing edge-of-field losses by approximately 166 million
tons. Therefore, the value of reducing sheet and rill erosion alone could be
as high as $332 million, which would offset the $331-million loss in overall
surplus. Moreover, this does not incorporate the values of other environ-
mental improvements attained simultaneously. In addition to the reductions
in sheet and rill erosion, nitrogen leaching falls by 14 percent, nitrogen
runoff by 13 percent, phosphorus runoff by 15 percent, soil productivity
losses by more than 300 percent, wind erosion by 21 percent, carbon emis-
sions by 7 percent, pesticide leaching by 9 percent, and pesticide runoff by
7 percent (table 3.5, column 5). 
12This conclusion does not hold for
working-land payment programs such
as EQIP with specific livestock com-
ponents.
13Under performance-based pro-
grams, farmers have an incentive to
adopt less intensive management sys-
tems with lower overall crop yield and
less environmental impact.
14Ribaudo et al. (1990) estimate the
value of reducing soil erosion for
recreational fishing to be $2 per ton
($2004). Other estimates include addi-
tional values, such as reduced dredging
costs, reduced water treatment costs,
and increased water-based recreation
(e.g., $4 per ton—Hansen and
Claassen, 2001).
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The modest size of EQIP prior to 2002 and the implementation of CSP in
2004 means there are little data to assess their outcomes directly. But
through simulation models, as undertaken in this chapter, unanswered ques-
tions can be explored over a range of program designs—i.e., budget levels,
enrollment options, eligibility criteria—and across the heterogeneous land-
scape of U.S. agriculture. 
• To what extent can programs improve producers’environmental 
performance? At funding of $1 billion, a performance-based program
with bidding provisions achieves improvements at an average cost of $6
per AEI point. Without the bidding provision, the average cost of
enhancing environmental performance by one AEI point increases to $8.
The average cost under a practice-based program without stewardship
provisions more than doubles to $17 per point, and increases to $73 per
AEI point when producers are eligible for stewardship payments based
on past conservation efforts. 
• What are the tradeoffs between improving the environment and support-
ing farm incomes? If the objective of the program is simply to increase
incomes of crop producers, performance-based programs are the most
cost-effective. They result in higher returns to production than under the
two practice-based programs. Returns to crop production increase by
approximately $9 per acre and $8 per acre under Bid and Performance,
at the $1-billion budget level. Incomes increase by just $4 per acre and
$3 per acre under the Practice and Good-Act programs. 
In general, WLPPs, as modeled here, increase returns to the agricultural sector
overall, but consumers (who fund these programs) may pay more for less food
depending on the program specifics. Overall, economic losses outweigh the
gains under all programs modeled here. However, we have not included the
value of the environmental gains—the impetus of these programs. Putting a
price tag on all the relative environmental improvements is beyond the scope
of this report, but evidence suggests that the value of these benefits could far
exceed the lost surplus at the aggregate market level. 
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Table 3.6—Economic impacts of stylized WLPPs (budget = $1 billion)
Change1
Practice Performance
Sector Base Good-Act Practice Hurdle-L Hurdle-H Performance Bid
$ million
Crop returns 32,744 1,059 1,273 1,205 1,210 2,560 3,182
Livestock returns 44,665 0 -80 -47 -42 -398 -570
Returns to agriculture 77,410 1,058 1,193 1,158 1,168 2,162 2,612
Overall gain/loss2 508,018 -79 -318 -186 -178 -331 -629
Change in environmental 
performance (percent) 1.3 5.6 3.3 4.4 11.7 15.5
1 These changes are relative to the USDA baseline projections for the year 2010 (USDA, WAOB, 2001).
2 Overall gains or losses include changes in returns to agricultural producers and changes in consumer surplus in addition to any deadweight
losses associated with movement from the initial steady-state equilibrium.The value of the environmental benefits obtained under these scenar-
ios is not included in the calculations.Chapter 4
WLPPs in a Broader Policy and
Economic Context
Agri-environmental payments on working lands represent an opportunity to
address negative environmental impacts associated with agriculture and
perhaps benefit agriculture economically. Given the diversity of U.S. agri-
culture, maximizing program performance would require that program
contracts be tailored to the specific circumstances of individual farms.
Creating that kind of flexibility in a “one size fits all” set of program guide-
lines is not easy. Policymakers face a myriad of decisions, any one of which
could have important implications for program performance. 
From the government’s point of view, enrolling producers in WLPPs is a lot
like hiring a contractor. The program, as first encountered by producers, is
more like a “request for proposals” than a simple offer to pay for services.
Through the request for proposals, program decisionmakers gather informa-
tion about the conservation actions producers are willing to take and the
level of payment they are willing to accept. The government, in turn, awards
contracts based on an assessment of the producer’s ability to generate envi-
ronmental benefits (or achieve other program goals) and the cost of the
contract. The trick, then, is to develop a request for proposals that is attrac-
tive to those producers who are best suited for the job, and to let the
proposal process itself do the job of sorting the best from the rest. 
This report uses a conceptual framework and simulation analysis to isolate
individual policy design decisions and assess the effect of each on program
performance. The truth is, however, that design decisions can rarely be
made independently of one another. Moreover, previous chapters focused on
issues relating to agri-environmental program design without considering
the broader economic, policy, and research contexts. Programs often have
impacts that are different or broader—temporally, geographically, or
throughout the economy—than originally intended. WLPPs also interact
with other programs, including other agri-environmental programs,
commodity programs, and some nonagricultural programs. We revisit some
of the key lessons of previous chapters, focusing on their inter-relatedness,
and raise some of these broader questions here because their answers, ulti-
mately, will be part of the story surrounding WLPP design. 
Designing WLPPs involves a suite of interrelated decisions. The basic
elements of policy design—budget levels, eligibility rules, enrollment
screening mechanisms, and participation incentives—can be combined in
many ways to establish an agri-environmental program. Design decisions
interact on at least three levels:
• If the budget is limited—as it is in all existing agri-environmental 
programs—eligibility rules, enrollment screening, and participation
incentives must be coordinated at least to the extent that spending limits
are not exceeded.
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one objective may preclude achieving another objective. 
• Stewardship payments likely reduce the level of new conservation
effort that can be achieved (i.e., new practices that can be
installed/adopted) given budget limitations.
• Bidding on financial assistance—if it is truly competitive—will
stretch conservation budgets by lowering the cost of individual
contracts, but the resulting payments are unlikely to provide much
in the way of direct support for farm income.
• Environmental objectives can complement or conflict with each
other—reduced runoff of nutrients to surface water could coincide
with increased leaching to ground water. Conversely, efforts to
reduce soil erosion could also reduce nutrient losses. Simulation
results suggest that environmental attributes tend to increase or
decrease in tandem.
• Cost-effective environmental gains are contingent on the careful coordi-
nation of eligibility rules, payment incentives, and enrollment screening
to attract only those producers who can deliver environmental gain at
low cost.
It is difficult to find the appropriate incentive structure that results in the
“right” amount of quality applications. Voluntary programs can achieve
specific environmental benefits only if decisions concerning eligibility
criteria, payment base, and payment limitations consider the type of benefits
sought. For example, under EQIP’s initial rule, confined animal feeding
operations (CAFOs—the largest livestock operations) could not have waste
management facilities funded under the program, even though half of EQIP
funds were earmarked for livestock-related concerns. Congress eliminated
that constraint in 2002, and a substantial share of EQIP funds now helps
offset the costs to CAFOs of complying with EPA’s new Clean Water Act
regulations addressing animal waste management.
A broad base of applicants provides program decisionmakers leverage in
pursuing environmental improvements. However, there can be too much of a
good thing. The administrative burden of accurately evaluating a large
number of applications can be high. Another side effect of too many appli-
cants (relative to available funds) is that qualified producers may be discour-
aged from applying if the program is deemed to be too competitive. This
may have been the case with EQIP initially. Great enthusiasm surrounded
the program at its inception, with over 70,000 applications a year in 1997
and 1998. But applications dropped to below 40,000 in 2001 as the percep-
tion spread that acceptance was difficult.
Program design influence on transaction costs can be important. How does
one create a competitive program without inducing producers to promise
more than they can deliver? This is an important question because moni-
toring and enforcement of contractual agreements, besides being unpopular,
are very costly. This is particularly true for working-land programs with
many eligible practices. EQIP was structured to be as environmentally cost-
effective as possible. Yet, 17 percent of contracts faced withdrawal of one or
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some expected environmental benefits as approved in the conservation plan
proved illusory (Cattaneo, 2003).
In a policy environment where it is costly to determine damages and enforce
them, the government may prefer not to pursue action against producers
who do not fully adhere to their conservation contracts. However, if
increasing enforcement is not viable, the government may modify the incen-
tives that lead to withdrawing practices prematurely. Many modifications to
EQIP introduced by the 2002 FSRI Act may reduce the producer’s incentive
to withdraw practices. Shorter contracts, allowing more than one contract
per tract of land, and elimination of the bidding procedure will likely
contribute to follow-through, making the benefits from the program more
certain. 
Design decisions can lead to unintended consequences. When payments
exceed participation costs for some producers, the potential exists for unin-
tended consequences. Like most other agricultural and agri-environmental
payments, WLPPs are tied to land management, so unintended conse-
quences are likely to include changes in land use or land values.
Payments that exceed production costs can encourage producers to shift
land use—changes that are typically an unintended consequence of policy.
For example, if the program increases (decreases) the profitability of crop
production relative to other land uses, producers may shift land from (to)
forest or grazing use to (from) crop production. Land use conversion is a
particular concern for CSP implementation, because tiered payments for
cropland are larger than those available on other types land. Producers could
gain by the conversion of some pastureland to crop production and, in the
absence of provisions to limit land use change, could seriously undercut
environmental gains. Even if the program results in environmental gains on
land already in crop production, expanding the area in crop production
could offset those gains to the extent that crop production is more damaging
to the environment than forest or grazing use (see Claassen et al., 2001, for
a broader discussion). These concerns are addressed in CSP by limiting
eligibility to land that was cropped in at least 4 of the 6 years prior to enact-
ment of the program. 
Land values may also be artificially inflated due to capitalization of
program benefits. This is the logical outcome of land-based farm support
payments. For example, early (pre-1990) CRP payments were capitalized
into the value of low-quality land that received payments higher than the
market value of such land (Shoemaker, 1989). WLPPs could increase land
values unintentionally through capitalization of payments if conservation
payments exceed conservation costs, if payments are tied to agricultural
land, or if payments are viewed as long-term in nature. Significant land
value effects are unlikely to flow from cost-sharing in programs like EQIP.
However, they could occur under CSP, where payments may exceed
producer conservation costs. 
Not all changes in land values are unintended, however. Conservation
improvements can also increase the value of the land by maintaining soil
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tions, and slowing the outflow of other production inputs like nutrients.
Structural practices like terracing, because they are long-term investments,
may be most effective in enhancing land values. Management practices,
such as conservation tillage or precision agriculture, may also maintain soil
structure and increase organic matter, and thus increase the intrinsic value of
the land. 
The equity objective, revisited. Some WLPPs may not only aim to provide
cost-effective environmental benefits, but to do so equitably, which compli-
cates considerably the choice of policy instruments for WLPPs. Two exam-
ples of tradeoffs that emerge from the joint consideration of efficiency and
equity are provided by (1) the bid-down provisions in EQIP and (2) the
inclusion of stewardship payments in CSP.
By revealing producers’ willingness-to-accept (WTA)—a combination of
practices offered and payments accepted—the EQIP bidding process was
cost-effective. From an equity point of view, however, bidding may also be
viewed as discriminating against producers who cannot afford to bid down
to get accepted into the program. Bidding on EQIP financial assistance was
prohibited by the 2002 Farm Bill. To limit cost in the absence of bidding,
USDA established a default cost-share rate of 50 percent for all practices,
with case-by-case exceptions for high-priority practices. This shift from bid-
based to fixed-rate cost-sharing may result in higher rates of cost-sharing for
most practices, reducing program cost-effectiveness. In some cases, where
higher rates of cost-sharing could be justified on the basis of potential envi-
ronmental benefit, exceptions to the default cost-share could be used to
target environmental priorities. Even so, such targeting is likely to be most
effective at the evaluation phase, where a proposal can be assigned a score
based on its environmental potential (especially true if site-specific factors
are considered in assigning points).
Equity is often cited as a reason for including “good actors” in programs
like CSP. Eligibility for stewardship payments is viewed by some as a
reward for good stewardship. Maintenance payments also serve to prevent
environmental damage when economic conditions change such that a
producer might remove a beneficial conservation structure (e.g., by plowing
under buffer strips) or discontinue a conservation practice (e.g., by overap-
plying nitrogen fertilizer). Producers who maintain these practices without
compensation may be at a competitive disadvantage relative to producers
who do not. Some argue that, in the long run, excluding good actors will
discourage producers from undertaking future environmental improvements
on their own, possibly resulting in perverse incentives against conservation.
Critics of maintenance payments argue that these payments do little to
improve the environmental performance of agriculture and divert limited
funds from activities that could improve overall environmental performance. 
How do different programs interact? Given the overlap between different
agricultural programs in terms of eligibility, many agricultural producers
could be directly affected by several programs and indirectly by others.
These programs affect a wide range of agricultural production decisions,
and many have environmental implications. While some programs directly
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performance through agricultural input and land use (e.g., commodity
program and tax policies). Coordination of all such programs pays obvious
dividends in avoiding duplication of effort, eliminating conflicts among
programs, and ensuring that where programs can work together or comple-
ment one another, these complementarities are fully realized. This is particu-
larly true now that agri-environmental payment programs are growing in
size relative to commodity programs. Of course, coordination would
increase the administrative effort needed to implement programs. A
complete analysis of cost-effectiveness would include both the benefits and
the costs of program coordination. 
Eligibility can eliminate duplication by preventing producers from receiving
payments from two programs on the same land. For example, it makes little
sense to continue commodity program payments on land enrolled in a land
retirement program. Annual land retirement payments are based on cash
rental rates, which incorporate the value of farm program payments. Receipt
of land retirement and commodity payments would constitute “double
dipping”—receiving overlapping benefits from more than one program.
Likewise, land enrolled in the CRP or the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP)
cannot also be enrolled in EQIP or the CSP. 
On the other hand, some programs are complementary and producers may
legitimately participate in two or more programs simultaneously. For
example, a producer located in an urban fringe area may benefit from farm-
land protection payments, receive commodity payments, and improve envi-
ronmental performance by receiving WLPP payments. Programs may also
be complementary in the sense that each has a unique function or “niche”
that is not filled by another program. In this case, coordination can improve
overall environmental gain by ensuring that eligibility and other enrollment
mechanisms direct producers toward the program that best advances the
overall goals of agri-environmental policy. For example, it may be more
cost-effective to retire land than attempt to address resource concerns with a
working-land program. That’s almost certainly true for many wetland serv-
ices (wildlife habitat, filtering runoff, and floodwater retention). Other
wildlife habitat may become viable only when the ecosystem is fully estab-
lished, a process that may take years, and thus can best be provided with a
long-term (10 years or more) dedication of that land to that purpose. A case
can be made for coordination between programs that encourage new conser-
vation effort (e.g., EQIP) and those that attempt to reward, and more impor-
tantly, preserve that conservation effort (e.g., CSP).
Eligibility criteria have also been used to reduce conflict among programs.
Agri-environmental programs can interact with commodity programs
because both can influence agricultural input use. A classic case of conflict
and subsequent coordination is the compliance mechanisms adopted in the
Food Security Act of 1985. There was evidence in the late 1970s and early
1980s to suggest that commodity programs were encouraging specific types
of crop production with the highest potential for environmental damage
(Watts et al., 1983; Reichelderfer, 1985). As such, commodity programs
were working at cross-purposes with programs designed to conserve soil
and preserve wetlands. Compliance mechanisms, adopted as part of the
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Federal agricultural programs contingent on certain soil conservation and
wetland preservation efforts (Claassen et al., 2004). Thus, consistency
between commodity programs and other agri-environmental programs was
increased. 
Finally, payment limits or contract flexibility may become coordination
issues if they affect producers’ program choices. Small operations will
generally not be affected by payment limits, but producers who are affected
will base their participation on the effective “incentive rate” considering the
payment ceiling. For example, EQIP at first provided up to 75 percent cost-
share, but the $50,000 payment limitation made the effective rate progres-
sively lower for farms undertaking conservation expenditures with total
costs above $66,700. 
What are the environmental benefits of working-land payment programs? If
WLPPs grow in terms of budget and affected acres, the demand for estimating
the benefits associated with these expenditures is sure to follow.1 Because of
the complexity of farm household decisionmaking, and the nonpoint source
and site-specific nature of agri-environmental problems, measuring the bene-
fits of agri-environmental conservation programs is data-demanding and tech-
nically challenging. Estimating the environmental benefits of a given program
would require identifying those changes in farmer decisions directly attribut-
able to the program, measuring the environmental change associated with
those farmer decisions, and, ideally, assigning economic values to those envi-
ronmental improvements. But valuing these “nonmarket” amenities is diffi-
cult. To date, good information on their values exists for only a subset of
attributes, such as the offsite costs of soil erosion, or only at a local scale, like
recreational values associated with pheasant viewing and hunting in the
Prairie Pothole region. In the absence of economic values, changes in environ-
mental metrics—like reduced nitrogen concentrations in water bodies and
enhanced soil carbon levels—can provide a benchmark upon which to gauge
program performance.
USDA has embarked upon an interagency effort designed to conduct a
national assessment of environmental benefits and effects of 2002 Farm Bill
programs (www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/NRI/ceap/). Achieving that goal will
depend on the ability to identify and measure those indicators that link to
farmers’responses to conservation programs and to the environmental attrib-
utes those programs aim to influence (Smith and Weinberg, 2004). 
Realizing the potential of WLPPs within the broader agri-environmental
policy context. Calls for improved program coordination, balancing multiple
objectives, and “global” assessments of program benefits could all be
addressed by developing a comprehensive conservation benefits index,
similar to our Aggregate Environmental Index (AEI), and using it to rank all
proposed conservation and environmental projects. USDA’s 2001 policy
vision statement, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New
Century, describes the possible creation of an expanded index that would
rate improvements in environmental, conservation, and rural community
categories, with scores based on the expected benefits during the time of
1A benefit-cost analysis is, in fact,
required for any U.S. government pro-
gram with budgetary implications
greater than $100 million. The exer-
cise has been carried out twice for
EQIP (USDA - NRCS, 1996 and
2003) and is currently ongoing for
CSP (USDA - NRCS, 2004). What
emerges from these studies is that
information is scarce concerning the
benefits on the ground of installed
conservation practices. Typically, prac-
tices are bundled by natural resource
concern addressed, and average esti-
mates are taken from the available 
literature.
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project durations that work best for them. 
Cost-effectiveness of all programs would increase by allowing proposals for
new activities on working lands to compete with proposals for retiring envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands or maintaining existing practices. Similarly,
single-year activities could compete with multiyear activities. Proposals for
management activities on working lands, like switching from conventional
to conservation tillage, would have lower opportunity costs than retiring the
land, and so should generate a lower bid. At the same time, conservation
tillage would likely receive a lower benefits score than land retirement.
Contracts would be awarded to owner/operators with the greatest benefit
index score relative to the bid. Moving to a single, comprehensive index
would require considerable resources and a multiyear phase-in. For
example, CRP and EQIP have very different approaches to constructing a
benefit index (see box, “Defining Program Objectives,” p. 10). Those
approaches could form a starting point for thinking about a single compre-
hensive index.
The estimation of environmental gains from conservation expenditures
could also benefit from the data gathering needed to build a comprehensive
environmental index. Smith and Weinberg (2004) note that reconciling
model predictions with actual observations is crucial for a successful
conservation program that relies on voluntary participation. One possible
approach would be to combine index data obtained as part of producers’
agri-environmental program applications with current environmental data
collection, as in the Natural Resources Inventory (NRI, USDA-NRCS,
1997). Even before the introduction of a comprehensive benefits index, such
an approach could be tested with current CRP and EQIP indices used to
rank applications. The information contained in these indices is not a phys-
ical measurement of impact, but rather an expected impact. Data collection
at the plot level for a subsample of participants (where available) would
assess the reliability and/or calibrate ex-ante benefit estimates. Combining
producers’WTA, estimated from past participation or solicited through a
bidding process, with calibrated environmental indices for multiple practices
can reduce implementation costs and vastly improve cost-effectiveness. 
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Economic Research Service/USDAAppendix—Participation Incentives
and Screening: A Graphical Analysis
The graphic analysis presented here is designed to help illustrate ideas
presented in the text. We assume that program decisionmakers allocate a
fixed budget among producers. Depending on the extent to which policy-
makers employ tools that enhance environmental cost-effectiveness (e.g.,
bidding, performance-based screening), the potential for environmental gain
can vary widely. 
For the sake of clarity, we simplify the problem by assuming:
• Producers all address the same resource concern(s);
• Producers can be divided into “high-benefit” and “low-benefit” groups;
• Fixed payments are the same for all producers (as may be the case for
management incentive payments within a single county);
• The distribution of WTA is the same for high- and low-benefit 
producers;
• The same proportion of high- and low-benefit producers have previously
addressed the resource concern.
Here (fig. A), payments are fixed across producers without regard to costs or
benefits. Payments are available for newly adopted practices only. For the
payment rate shown, not all applicants can be enrolled. The screen reduces
participation to match the budget (area A+B). Area A represents the cost of
adopting new practices while area B represents surplus to the producer. In
theory, a lower payment rate would reduce surplus to producers while
enrolling the same producers in the program. However, program decision-
makers are unlikely to know the exact location of the WTA curve. 
Because WTA is distributed in the same way across producers, an equal
proportion of high-benefit and low-benefit producers accept the payment
and address the resource concern. If producers in the high-benefit category
were more likely to have low costs, environmental gain would increase. If
they were more like to have high costs, environmental gain would decline. 
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A BIn figure B, a stewardship payment component is added by extending
payments to include previously adopted practices as well as new practices at
the same payment rate. Given the fixed budget, the proportion of acres
enrolled (and associated environmental gain) declines because budget
resources are devoted to stewardship payments (area C). Other, somewhat
less lucrative stewardship payments could be devised if it is possible to
distinguish existing conservation practices from newly adopted practices.
For structural practices, it is easy to detect existing practices. For some
management practices, it could be quite difficult.
In figure C, performance-based screening shifts participation toward high-
benefit producers. While the payment rate remains fixed, the screen gives
preference to high-benefit producers. Because cost (in terms of program
budget) is constant across producers while benefits are not, as much funding
as possible is directed to high-benefit producers (as depicted above, all
funding goes to high-benefit producers, areas A+B). In reality, there would
be variation in contract cost—not all funding would go to producers
yielding the highest benefit.
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enrolledIf payments are based on bids and enrollment is truly competitive, producers
will bid payments down to roughly the level of their WTA (payments = area
A in figure D). Because producers no longer receive surplus as in the fixed-
payment case, the enrollment screen can be relaxed, increasing program
enrollment and environmental gain. Note that the number of applicants
depends on the maximum payment rate. Everyone with WTA less than the
maximum payment rate applies for the program.
If the screen is based on environmental performance, program decision-
makers can target participation toward high-benefit producers (fig. E).
However, because the cost of contracts varies, cost-effectiveness may be
obtained by seeking a balance between benefits and costs, retaining some
low-benefit producers because they can realize these benefits at a low cost.
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Proportion
of acresFinally, in figure F, performance-based payments direct higher levels of
participation toward high-benefit producers through the use of higher
payments (assuming the equal distribution of costs among high- and low-
benefit producers). If payments (areas A + B) exceed the budget, a screening
device will be needed to reduce expenditures.
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Web Appendices A-C are available online only.
You can find them on the ERS website at 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err5/webappendix.